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Sveti Janez Bosko

Don Bosko – Mužlja 2022

V ponedeljek, 31. januarja 2022, je bila v Mužlji lepa slovesnost: proslavljali smo god mladinskega vzgojitelja, »očeta mladine«, svetega Janeza Boska ali kratko don Boska.

»Cerkev in šola naj bi bili sestri«  »Cerkev in šola – sestri sta dve – ena brez druge - biti ne sme.« Tako je dejal blaženi Anton Martin Slomšek. Pri tem ga je vodila glavna misel, da se vzgoja v cerkvi in šoli dopolnjujeta in tako gradita zdravo in celotno človeško in krščansko osebnost mladega človeka. Prav to je bila tudi misel velikega mladinskega vzgojitelja Don Boska. Ta praznik smo vsako leto obhajali zelo slovesno in je na poseben način praznik naših prijateljev – salezijanskih sotrudnikov oziroma sodelavcev. Oni imajo po don Boskovi zamisli nenadomestljiv delež pri vzgoji mladine. Tam pomagajo tako duhovno kot gmotno. Don Bosko je začel svoje delo iz nič in je zato potreboval veliko podpornikov, ki jih je našel tudi v visoki družbi. Če je bilo potrebno, je marsikomu izprosil tudi čudežno ozdravljenje. Danes so še veliko bolj potrebni pomočniki pri vzgoji. Ker je Janez Bosko bil revnega stanu, ni mogel računati na svoje domače. Tudi pri maši in kosilu po maši je bilo navzoče lepo število salezijanskih sotrudnikov. Njihovo število se je od njihove ustanovitve do danes hudo skrčilo: več ko polovica jih je že odšlo po nebeško plačilo, nekateri so onemogli ali bolni, nekateri se pa zaradi pandemije ne upajo v večjo družbo. Poleg sotrudnikov pa so bili pri maši tudi šolski otroci z njihovimi učitelji in ravnateljem. Šola Mihály Szervó je vizavi cerkve in je bila v zgodovini – kakor tudi danes – tesno povezana z verskim življenjem v fari Marijinega Imena – v Mužlji, prav po Slomškovih besedah: »Cerkev in šola – sestri sta dve – ena brez druge - biti ne sme.« V Srbiji imamo namreč od nastopa demokratičnih sprememb leta 2000 verouk ne le v cerkvi, ampak tudi v šoli. Prej so imeli od strani učiteljev duhovniki-veroučitelji velike probleme.

V bivši komunistični Jugoslaviji je bil namreč najhujši pritisk na vero, zlasti katoliško, posebej še v Vojvodini. Od ljudi sem slišal, da je v vasi Konak neki učitelj Gojko pozvedoval, kje so barvali pirhe ali pripravljali jaslice. Če je kje kaj takega bilo, je otroka lasal in butal z glavo ob šolsko tablo. Taka strahovlada ni bila le v Konaku. Ko so nastopile demokratične spremembe leta 2000, mi je tamkajšnji mladi pravoslovni duhovnik dejal, da bo zaupal učitelju Gojku vodenje cerkvene blagajne. Jaz sem pripomnil, da to ne bi bilo najprimerneje, saj je on maltretiral ne le katoliških, ampak tudi pravoslavne otroke-vernike. Tudi v Belem Blatu je učitelj vohunil pred cerkvijo za otroki, in jih potem zlostavljal med šolsko uro, če so bili pri maši ali cerkvenem verouku. V Jaši Tomiču – nekdanjem Modošu, so z razglasa v tamkajšnji šoli še 1988. leta prepovedovali otrokom, da bi hodili v cerkev. Svoboda veroizpovedi je bila pod komunizmom le na papirju – da zamaže oči svetovne javnosti. O tem, kaj so zganjali nekateri učitelji po Vojvodini, bi lahko napisal človek cel roman. Tako so v Ečki govorili za nekega učitelja-Madžara, da je otroke v šoli celo tepel, če so šli k verouku. Ko sem ga v novem času o tem vprašal, je dejal: »Jaz nisem nikoli nikomur branil hoditi v cerkev ali k verouku.« Torej so si otroci vse to zmislili? Sedaj so krivci na svoj terorizem čisto »pozabili« - podobno kot organizatorji povojnih pobojev - Nekdo pa ni. Šele s prihodom salezijancev se je začelo svobodnejše versko življenje, saj je bil prvi župnik Jožef Tkalec in njegov naslednik Štefan Zorko vajen večje svobode na slovenskih tleh. Ni se bal zoperstaviti taki protiverski nestrpnosti – in otroci so v večjem številu in bolj redno začeli prihajati k verouku in prejemanju zakramentov – z njimi pa tudi starši in njihovi sorodniki. Pri verouku so radi gledali salezijanske don Boskove »filmine«, ki jih je sobrat Vinko Furlan pogumno tihotapil takrat iz Italije. Kot mnogi slovenski duhovniki je tudi Zorko moral prenašati mnoga zasliševanja in tudi zapor. Pravil je, da je bil z duhovniki posebno surov Stane Dolanc, ki je tudi njega zasliševal. Medtem pa je bil Zdenko Roter veliko bolj zvit in je na limanice dobil s svojo diplomacijo tudi nekatere duhovnike No, danes imamo glede verske in nravne izobrazbe toliko svobode, da je niti ne znamo izkoristiti. V Srbiji je umorjeni Zoran Džindžič uspel – kljub hudemu nasprotovanju levice – da je postal verouk obvezni izborni predmet. Danes lahko izbirajo otroci med veroukom in državljansko vzgojo. Nekdaj so v šoli načrtno hujskali otroke in učitelje zoper Cerkev. Od demokratičnih sprememb pa šola sodeluje z Cerkvijo in obratno.

Pošteni državljani in dobri kristjani Tudi letos so prišli otroci vseh štirih nižjih razredov z njihovimi učitelji in ravnateljem šole v cerkev k maši. Ko je namreč prišel verouk v šolo, niso postali glavni namembniki katehetovega delovanja učenci, ampak predvsem profesorski zbor. V neposrednem stiku so kopneli predsodki in vedno bolj se je krepilo spoznanje, da obojni delajo za isti cilj: vzgojiti znanstveno, versko in moralno trdno osebnost. Kot vsako leto so bili povabljeni k slovesnosti vsi duhovniki. Vendar so se kot po navadi odzvali škofijski duhovniki le iz dveh župnij: iz Novega Bečeja je prišel kaplan János Halmai ter župnik in dekan József Melár, ki je vodil somaševanje. Somaševali so tudi vsi domači salezijanci – Stojan Kalapiš, Stanko Tratnjek, Rafo Pinosa in Janez Jelen. Iz bližnjega Bečkereka je prišel župnik Tamás Masa, protonotar in upokojeni župnik Jenő Tietze, kakor tudi župnik Mihajlova in Neuzine – ki pa stanuje tudi v bečkereškem župnišču – verbit Elija Ohoiledwarin SVD iz Indonezije.

V pridigi je omenil, kako je don Bosko sodoben vzgojitelj, ki ni samo uporabljal najsodobnejših metod, ampak je bil daleč pred svojim časom. Znano je, da so nekateri duhovniki nad njegovim načinom tako pohujševali, da so ga hoteli odpeljati v norišnico; Don Bosko pa ju je prelisičil in tako so se zdravniki začudeni spraševali: »Pričakovali smo enega, zdaj je pa kočijaž pripeljal dva.« 

In v čem je bila njegova novost? Nekatere njegove smernice je sprejel tudi naš čas in so postale del našega vzgojnega sistema. Svoj način je poimenoval preventivni sistem v nasprotju od represivnega, ki je bil tedaj v splošni rabi. Pri represivnem načinu vzgojitelj razloži pravila in potem prestopnike kaznuje. Pri preventivnem pa pravila razloži, potem je pa vzgojitelj stalno navzoč, da prepreči prestopek in na ta način ni potrebno kaznovanje. Seveda je danes nevarnost tretja smer, a to je permisivni sistem – da otroku vzgojitelj vse dopušča in v vsem popušča, češ da tako zahtevajo pravice otroka in današnja mentaliteta. Če je vzgojitelj odgovoren pred Bogom, potem se bo odločil ravno za don Boskov preventivni ali preprečevalni način. Seveda pa je tak način mogoč le na temelju vere v Jezusa Kristusa in odgovornosti, ki jo ima pred Bogom ne le vzgojitelj, ampak tudi gojenec. Don Bosko poudarja, da je vzgoja možna le ob uporabi razuma in vere. Danes nekateri proticepilci ravno nasprotno na dan vlačijo protestantovsko zmotno načelo: »Samo vera!« ki je eno od treh napak: sola fides (morajo biti tudi dela), sola gratia (mora biti tudi človeško sodelovanje) in pa sola scriptura (mora se upoštevati tudi Cerkev in njeno vodstvo). Don Bosko je imel veliko zaupanje v moč človeškega razuma in je zato vztrajno in ljubeznivo prepričeval mlade, naj sovražijo greh in ljubijo krepost – ter je vzgojil čez 6000 duhovniških, redovniških in misijonarskih poklicev – med njimi tudi mladega svetnika – Dominika Savia.

Aleksej Navalni

Alexei Navalny
Алексей Навальный
Navalny in 2011
Leader of the Russia of the Future party
Trenutni nosilec naziva
Začetek delovanja 17 November 2013
Namestnik	Leonid Volkov
Predhodnik	Office established
Founding member of the Anti-Corruption Foundation
Na položaju 9 September 2011 – July 2020
Osebni podatki
Rojstvo	Alexei Anatolievich Navalny (1976-06-04) 4. junij 1976 Butyn, Odintsovsky District, Moscow Oblast, Soviet Union
Narodnost	Russian
Politična stranka	Russia of the Future (2018–present)
Druga politična pripadnost	Yabloko (2000–2007) Progress Party (2013–2018)
Zakonci	Yulia Abrosimova ​ (por. 2000)​
Otroci	2
Bivališče	Moscow
Izobrazba	Peoples' Friendship University of Russia Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation Yale University (non-degree fellowship)
Poznan po	Anti-corruption activism
Nagrade	Yale World Fellow (2010) Knight of Freedom Award (2021) Sakharov Prize (2021)
Podpis
Predloga:Infobox YouTube personality

Alexei Anatolievich Navalny (rusko Алексей Анатольевич Навальный, dob. 'ɐlʲɪkˈsʲej ɐnɐˈtolʲjɪvʲɪtɕ nɐˈvalʲnɨj'; born 4 June 1976) is a Russian opposition leader, lawyer, and anti-corruption activist. He came to international prominence by organizing anti-government demonstrations and running for office to advocate reforms against corruption in Russia, and against President Vladimir Putin and his government. Putin avoids directly referring to Navalny by name. Navalny was a Russian Opposition Coordination Council member. He is the leader of the Russia of the Future party and the founder of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK).

Navalny has more than six million YouTube subscribers and more than two million Twitter followers. Through these channels, he publishes material about corruption in Russia, organizes political demonstrations and promotes his campaigns. In a 2011 radio interview, he described Russia's ruling party, United Russia, as a "party of crooks and thieves," which became a popular epithet. Navalny and the FBK have published investigations detailing alleged corruption by high-ranking Russian officials. In March 2017, Navalny and the FBK released the documentary He Is Not Dimon to You, accusing Dmitry Medvedev, the then prime minister and former president of Russia, of corruption, leading to mass protests across the country.

In July 2013, Navalny received a suspended sentence for embezzlement. Despite this, he was allowed to run for mayor in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election and came in second, with 27% of the vote, outperforming expectations but losing to incumbent mayor Sergey Sobyanin, a Putin appointee. In December 2014, Navalny received another suspended sentence for embezzlement. Both of his criminal cases were widely considered to be politically motivated and intended to bar him from running in future elections. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) later ruled that the cases violated Navalny's right to a fair trial, but they were never overturned. In December 2016, Navalny launched his presidential campaign for the 2018 presidential election but he was barred by Russia's Central Electoral Commission (CEC) after registering due to his prior criminal conviction and the Supreme Court of Russia rejected his appeal. In 2017, the CEC stated that he would not be eligible to run for president until after 2028. In 2018, he initiated Smart Voting, a tactical voting strategy intended to consolidate the votes of those who oppose United Russia, in order to deprive them of seats in elections.

In August 2020, Navalny was hospitalized in serious condition after he was poisoned with a Novichok nerve agent. He was medically evacuated to Berlin and discharged a month later. Navalny accused Putin of being responsible for his poisoning, and an investigation implicated agents from the Federal Security Service (FSB). The EU, UK and US responded by imposing sanctions on senior Russian officials. On 17 January 2021, he returned to Russia and was detained on accusations of violating parole conditions (imposed as a result of his 2014 conviction) because he had failed to report to Russia's Federal Prison Service (FSIN) twice per month during his illness. Following his arrest and the release of the documentary Putin's Palace which accused Putin of corruption, mass protests across the country were held. On 2 February, his suspended sentence was replaced with a prison sentence, meaning he will spend over two and half years in a corrective labour colony in Vladimir Oblast. A resolution by the ECHR called for his release. While in prison, Navalny and human rights groups have accused Russian authorities of using torture against him. He is recognized by Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience. In October 2021, he was awarded the Sakharov Prize for his work on human rights.

Early life and career

Navalny is of Russian and Ukrainian descent. His father is from Zalissia, a village near the border of Belarus in Ivankiv Raion, Kyiv Oblast, Ukraine. Navalny grew up in Obninsk about 100 km (62 mi) south-west of Moscow, but spent his childhood summers with his grandmother in Ukraine, acquiring proficiency in the Ukrainian language. His parents, Anatoly Navalny and Lyudmila Navalnaya, own a basket-weaving factory in the village of Kobyakovo, Vologda Oblast, which they have run since 1994.

Navalny graduated from the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia in 1998 with a law degree. He then studied securities and exchanges at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation. Navalny received a scholarship to the Yale World Fellows program at Yale University in 2010.

Political activity

Yabloko

Russian United Democratic Party "Yabloko"

In 2000, following the announcement of a new law that would raise the electoral threshold for State Duma elections, Navalny joined the Russian United Democratic Party Yabloko. According to Navalny, the law was stacked against Yabloko and Union of Right Forces, and he decided to join, even though he was not "a big fan" of either organization. In 2001, he was listed as a member of the party. In 2002, he was elected to the regional council of the Moscow branch of Yabloko. In 2003, he headed the Moscow subdivision of the election campaign of the party for the parliamentary election held in December. In April 2004, Navalny became Chief of staff of the Moscow branch of Yabloko, which he remained until February 2007. Also in 2004, he also became Deputy Chief of the Moscow branch of the party. From 2006 to 2007, he was a member of the Federal Council of the party.

In August 2005, Navalny was incorporated into the Social Council of Central Administrative Okrug of Moscow, created prior to the Moscow City Duma election held later that year, in which he took part as a candidate. In November, he was one of the initiators of the Youth Public Chamber, intended to help younger politicians take part in legislative initiatives. At the same time, in 2005, Navalny started another youth social movement, named "DA! – Democratic Alternative". The project was not connected to Yabloko (nor any other political party). Within the movement, Navalny participated in a number of projects. In particular, he was one of the organizers of the movement-run political debates, which soon got resonance in the media. Navalny also organized television debates via state-run Moscow channel TV Center; two initial episodes showed high ratings, but the show was suddenly cancelled. According to Navalny, authorities prohibited some people from receiving TV coverage.

In late 2006, Navalny appealed to the Moscow City Hall, asking it to grant permission to conduct the nationalist 2006 Russian march. However, he added that Yabloko condemned "any ethnic or racial hatred and any xenophobia" and called on the police to oppose "any fascist, Nazi, xenophobic manifestations".

In July 2007, Navalny resigned from the post of Deputy Chief of the Moscow branch of the party. He was consequently expelled from Yabloko for demanding a resignation of the chairman of the party, Grigory Yavlinsky He co-founded in 2007 the National Russian Liberation Movement, known as NAROD (The People), that sets immigration policy as a priority. The movement allied itself with two nationalist groups, the Movement Against Illegal Immigration and Great Russia.

2011 parliamentary election and 2011–2013 protests

Navalny at the courthouse, 6 December 2011

In December 2011, after parliamentary elections and accusations of electoral fraud, approximately 6,000 people gathered in Moscow to protest the contested result, and an estimated 300 people were arrested, including Navalny. Navalny was arrested on 5 December. After a period of uncertainty for his supporters, Navalny appeared in court and was sentenced to the maximum 15 days "for defying a government official". Alexei Venediktov, editor-in-chief of Echo of Moscow radio station, called the arrest "a political mistake: jailing Navalny transforms him from an online leader into an offline one". After his arrest, his blog became available in English. Navalny was kept in the same prison as several other activists, including Ilya Yashin and Sergei Udaltsov, the unofficial leader of the Vanguard of Red Youth, a radical Russian communist youth group. Udaltsov went on a hunger strike to protest against the conditions.

Navalny at Moscow rally, 10 March 2012

Upon his release on 20 December, Navalny called on Russians to unite against Putin, who Navalny said would try to claim victory in the presidential election, which was held on 4 March 2012. In a profile published the day after his release, BBC News described Navalny as "arguably the only major opposition figure to emerge in Russia in the past five years".

After his release, Navalny informed reporters that it would be senseless for him to run in the presidential elections because the Kremlin would not allow the elections to be fair. But he said that if free elections were held, he would "be ready" to run. On 24 December, he helped lead a demonstration, estimated at 50,000 people, which was much larger than the previous post-election demonstration. Speaking to the crowd, he said, "I see enough people to take the Kremlin right now".

In March 2012, after Putin was elected president, Navalny helped lead an anti-Putin rally in Moscow's Pushkinskaya Square, attended by between 14,000 and 20,000 people. After the rally, Navalny was detained by authorities for several hours, then released. On 8 May, the day after Putin was inaugurated, Navalny and Udaltsov were arrested after an anti-Putin rally at Clean Ponds, and were each given 15-day jail sentences. Amnesty International designated the two men prisoners of conscience. On 11 June, Moscow prosecutors conducted a 12-hour search of Navalny's home, office, and the apartment of one of his relatives. Soon afterwards, some of Navalny's personal emails were posted online by a pro-government blogger.

New party

Logo of the People's Alliance, used in 2012–2014

Logo of Progress Party, used since 2014

On 26 June 2012, it was announced that Navalny's comrades would establish a new political party based on e-democracy; Navalny declared he did not plan to participate in this project at the moment. On 31 July, they filed a document to register an organizing committee of a future party named "The People's Alliance". The party identified itself as centrist; one of the then-current leaders of the party, and Navalny's ally Vladimir Ashurkov, explained this was intended to help the party get a large share of voters. Navalny said the concept of political parties was "outdated", and added his participation would make maintaining the party more difficult. However, he "blessed" the party and discussed its maintenance with its leaders. They, in turn, stated they wanted to eventually see Navalny as a member of the party. On 15 December, Navalny expressed his support of the party, saying, "The People's Alliance is my party", but again refused to join it, citing the criminal cases against him.

On 10 April 2013, the party filed documents for the official registration of the party. On 30 April, the registration of the party was suspended. On 5 July, the party was declined registration; according to Izvestia, not all founders of the party were present during the congress, even though the papers contained their signatures. Navalny reacted to that with a tweet saying, "[...] A salvo of all guns". Following the mayoral election, on 15 September, Navalny declared he would join and, possibly, head the party. On 17 November Navalny was elected as the leader of the party.

On 8 January 2014, Navalny's party filed documents for registration for the second time. On 20 January, registration of the party was suspended; according to Russian laws, no two parties can share a name. On 8 February, Navalny's party changed its name to "Progress Party". On 25 February, the party was registered, and at this point, had six months to register regional branches in at least half of the federal subjects of Russia. On 26 September, the party declared it had registered 43 regional branches. An unnamed source of Izvestia in the ministry said registrations completed after the six-month term would not be taken into consideration, adding, "Yes, trials are taking place in some regions [...] they cannot register new branches in other regions during the trials, because the main term is over". Navalny's blog countered, "Our answer is simple. A six-month term for registration has been legally prolonged ad interim prosecution of appeals of denials and registration suspensions".

Navalny's election campaign in 2013

On 1 February 2015, the party held a convention, where Navalny stated the party was preparing for the 2016 elections, declaring the party would maintain its activity across Russia, saying, "We are unabashed to work in remote lands where the opposition does not work. We can even [work] in Crimea". The candidates the party would appoint were to be chosen via primary elections; however, he added, the party's candidates may be removed from elections. On 17 April, the party initiated a coalition of democratic parties. On 28 April, the party was deprived of registration by the Ministry of Justice, which stated the party had not registered the required number of regional branches within six months after the official registration. Krainev claimed that the party could be eliminated only by the Supreme Court, and he added that not all trials of registration of regional branches were over, calling the verdict "illegal twice". He added that the party would appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, and expressed confidence that the party would be restored and admitted to elections. The next day, the party officially challenged the verdict.

2013 Moscow mayoral candidacy

Ratings of Sobyanin and Navalny
among those who said they would vote,
according to Synovate Comcon polls

Time	Sobyanin	Navalny	Ref
2 September 2013 !29 August–2 September	60.1%	21.9%
28 August 2013 !22–28 August	63.9%	19.8%
21 August 2013 !15–21 August	62.5%	20.3%
14 August 2013 !8–14 August	63.5%	19.9%
7 August 2013 !1–7 August	74.6%	15.0%
31 July 2013 !25–31 July	76.2%	16.7%
24 July 2013 !18–24 July	76.6%	15.7%
17 July 2013 !11–16 July	76.2%	14.4%
10 July 2013 !4–10 July	78.5%	10.7%
3 July 2013 !27 June–3 July	77.9%	10.8%

Percentages of Muscovites who voted for Navalny during the election

Navalny's meeting at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, 9 September 2013

On 30 May 2013, Sergey Sobyanin, the mayor of Moscow, argued an elected mayor is an advantage for the city compared to an appointed one, and on 4 June, he announced he would meet President Vladimir Putin and ask him for a snap election, mentioning the Muscovites would agree the governor elections should take place in the city of Moscow and the surrounding Moscow Oblast simultaneously. On 6 June, the request was granted, and the next day, the Moscow City Duma appointed the election on 8 September, the national voting day.

On 3 June, Navalny announced he would run for the post. To become an official candidate, he would need either seventy thousand signatures of Muscovites or to be pegged for the office by a registered party, and then to collect 110 signatures of municipal deputies from 110 different subdivisions (three-quarters of Moscow's 146). Navalny chose to be pegged by a party, RPR–PARNAS.

Among the six candidates who were officially registered as such, only two (Sobyanin and Communist Ivan Melnikov) were able to collect the required number of the signatures themselves, and the other four were given a number of signatures by the Council of Municipal Formations, following a recommendation by Sobyanin, to overcome the requirement (Navalny accepted 49 signatures, and other candidates accepted 70, 70, and 82).

On 17 July, Navalny was registered as one of the six candidates for the Moscow mayoral election. However, on 18 July, he was sentenced to a five-year prison term for the embezzlement and fraud charges that were declared in 2012. Several hours after his sentencing, he pulled out of the race and called for a boycott of the election. However, later that day, the prosecution office requested the accused should be freed on bail and released from travel restrictions, since the verdict had not yet taken legal effect, saying that the accused had previously followed the restrictions. Navalny was a mayoral candidate, and an imprisonment would thus not comply with his rule for equal access to the electorate. On his return to Moscow after being freed, pending an appeal, he vowed to stay in the race. The Washington Post has speculated that his release was ordered by the Kremlin in order to make the election and Sobyanin appear more legitimate.

Navalny's campaign was successful in fundraising: out of 103.4 million rubles (approximately $3.09 million as of the election day), the total size of his electoral fund, 97.3 million ($2.91 million) were transferred by individuals throughout Russia; such an amount is unprecedented in Russia. It achieved a high profile through an unprecedentedly large campaign organization that involved around 20,000 volunteers who passed out leaflets and hung banners, in addition to conducting several campaign rallies a day around the city; they were the main driving force for the campaign. The New Yorker described the resulted campaign as "a miracle", along with Navalny's release on 19 July, the fundraising campaign, and the personality of Navalny himself. The campaign received very little television coverage and did not utilize billboards. Thanks to Navalny's strong campaign (and Sobyanin's weak one), his result grew over time, weakening Sobyanin's, and in the end of the campaign, he declared the runoff election (to be conducted if none of the candidates receives at least 50% of votes) was "a hair's breadth away".

The largest sociological research organizations predicted that Sobyanin would win the election, scoring 58% to 64% of the vote; they expected Navalny to receive 15–20% of the vote, and the turnout was to be 45–52%. (Levada Center was the only one not to have made any predictions; the data it had on 28 August, however, falls in line with other organizations.) The final results of the voting showed Navalny received 27% of the vote, more than candidates appointed by the parties that received second, third, fourth, and fifth highest results during the 2011 parliamentary elections, altogether. Navalny fared better in the center and southwest of Moscow, which have higher income and education levels. However, Sobyanin received 51% of the vote, which meant he won the election. The turnout was 32%. The organizations explained the differences were because Sobyanin's electorate did not vote, as they felt that their candidate was guaranteed to win. Navalny's campaign office predicted Sobyanin would score 49–51%, and Navalny would get 24–26% of votes.

Many experts said the election had been fair, that the number of irregularities had been much lower than those of other elections held within the country, and that the irregularities had had little effect on the result. Dmitri Abyzalov, leading expert of Center of Political Conjuncture, added low turnout figures provide a further sign of fairness of the election, because that shows they were not overestimated. However, according to Andrei Buzin, co-chairman of the GOLOS Association, State Departments of Social Security added people who did not originally want to vote to lists of those who would vote at home, with the number of such voters being 5% of those who voted, and added this did cause questions if Sobyanin would score 50% if this did not take place. Dmitry Oreshkin, leader of the "People's election commission" project (who did a separate counting based on the data from election observers; their result for Sobyanin was 50%), said now that the runoff election was only 2% away, all details would be looked at very closely, and added it was impossible to prove "anything" juridically.

On 9 September, the day following the election, Navalny publicly denounced the tally, saying, "We do not recognize the results. They are fake". Sobyanin's office rejected an offer of a vote recount. On 12 September, Navalny addressed the Moscow City Court to overturn the result of the poll; the court rejected the assertion. Navalny then challenged the decision in the Supreme Court of Russia, but the court ruled that the election results were legitimate.

RPR-PARNAS and democratic coalition

Following the mayoral election, Navalny was offered a position as the fourth co-chairman of RPR-PARNAS. However, Navalny made no public reaction.

On 14 November 2014, the two remaining RPR-PARNAS co-chairmen, Boris Nemtsov and former Prime Minister of Russia Mikhail Kasyanov, declared it was the right moment to create a wide coalition of political forces, who favor the "European choice"; Navalny's Progress Party was seen as one of the potential participants. However, on 27 February 2015, Nemtsov was shot dead. Prior to his assassination, Nemtsov worked on a project of a coalition, in which Navalny and Khodorkovsky would become co-chairmen of RPR-PARNAS. Navalny declared merging parties would invoke bureaucratic difficulties and question the legitimacy of party's right to participate in federal elections without signatures collecting. However, Nemtsov's murder accelerated the work, and on 17 April, Navalny declared a wide discussion had taken place among Progress Party, RPR-PARNAS, and other closely aligned parties, which resulted in an agreement of formation of a new electoral bloc between the two leaders. Soon thereafter, it was signed by four other parties and supported by Khodorkovsky's Open Russia foundation. Electoral blocs are not present within the current law system of Russia, so it would be realized via means of a single party, RPR-PARNAS, which is not only eligible for participation in statewide elections, but is also currently not required to collect citizens' signatures for the right to participate in the State Duma elections scheduled for September 2016, due to the regional parliament mandate previously taken by Nemtsov. The candidates RPR-PARNAS would appoint were to be chosen via primary elections.

Protesters marching along Moscow's Tverskaya Street, 26 March 2017

The coalition claimed to have collected enough citizens' signatures for registration in the four regions it originally aimed for. However, in one region, the coalition would declare some signatures and personal data have been altered by malevolent collectors; signatures in the other regions have been rejected by regional election commissions. Сomplaints have been issued to the Central Election Commission of Russia, after which the coalition has been registered as a participant in a regional election in one of the three contested regions, Kostroma Oblast. According to a source of Gazeta.ru "close to the Kremlin", the presidential administration saw coalition's chances as very low, yet was wary, but the restoration in one region occurred so PARNAS could "score a consolation goal". According to the official election results, the coalition scored 2% of votes, not enough to overcome the 5% threshold; the party admitted the election was lost.

2018 presidential election

Navalny announced his entry into the presidential race on 13 December 2016, however on 8 February 2017, the Leninsky district court of Kirov repeated its sentence of 2013 (which was previously annulled after the decision of ECHR, which ruled that Russia had violated Navalny's right to a fair trial, in the Kirovles case) and charged him with a five-year suspended sentence. This sentence, if it came into force and remained valid, might prohibit the future official registration of Navalny as a candidate. Navalny announced that he would pursue the annulment of the sentence that clearly contradicts the decision of ECHR. Moreover, Navalny announced that his presidential campaign would proceed independently of court decisions. He referred to the Russian Constitution (Article 32), which deprives only two groups of citizens of the right to be elected: those recognized by the court as legally unfit and those kept in places of confinement by a court sentence. According to Freedom House and The Economist, Navalny was the most viable contender to Vladimir Putin in the 2018 election. Navalny organized a series of anti-corruption rallies in different cities across Russia in March. This appeal was responded to by the representatives of 95 Russian cities, and four cities abroad: London, Prague, Basel and Bonn.

Navalny was attacked by unknown assailants outside his office in the Anti-Corruption Foundation on 27 April 2017. They sprayed brilliant green dye, possibly mixed with other components, into his face in a Zelyonka attack that can damage eyes of the victim. He had been attacked before, earlier in the spring. In the second attack, the green-colored disinfectant had evidently been mixed with a caustic chemical, resulting in a chemical burn to his right eye. He reportedly lost 80 percent of the sight in his right eye. Navalny accused the Kremlin of orchestrating the attack.

Navalny was released from jail on 27 July 2017 after spending 25 days of imprisonment. Before that, he was arrested in Moscow for participating in protests and was sentenced to 30 days in jail for organizing illegal protests.

Navalny campaign rally in Yekaterinburg, 16 September 2017

In September, Human Rights Watch accused Russian police of systematic interference with Navalny's presidential campaign. "The pattern of harassment and intimidation against Navalny's campaign is undeniable," said Hugh Williamson, Europe, and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "Russian authorities should let Navalny's campaigners work without undue interference and properly investigate attacks against them by ultra-nationalists and pro-government groups." On 21 September, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe invited Russian authorities, in connection with the Kirovles case, "to use urgently further avenues to erase the prohibition on Mr. Navalny's standing for election".

Navalny was sentenced to 20 days in jail on 2 October 2017 for calls to participate in protests without approval from state authorities.

In December 2017, Russia's Central Electoral Commission barred Navalny from running for president in 2018, citing Navalny's corruption conviction. The European Union said Navalny's removal cast "serious doubt" on the election. Navalny called for a boycott of the 2018 presidential election, stating his removal meant that millions of Russians were being denied their vote. Navalny filed an appeal against the Russian Supreme Court's ruling on 3 January, however a few days later on 6 January, the Supreme Court of Russia rejected his appeal. Navalny led protests on 28 January 2018 to urge a boycott of Russia's 2018 presidential election. Navalny was arrested on the day of the protest and then released the same day, pending trial. OVD-Info reported that 257 people were arrested throughout the country. According to Russian news reports, police stated Navalny was likely to be charged with calling for unauthorized demonstrations. Two of Navalny's associates were given brief jail terms for urging people to attend unsanctioned opposition rallies. Navalny stated on 5 February 2018 the government was accusing Navalny of assaulting an officer during the protests. Navalny was among 1600 people detained during 5 May protests prior to Putin's inauguration; Navalny was charged with disobeying police. On 15 May, he was sentenced to 30 days in jail. Immediately after his release on 25 September 2018, he was arrested and convicted for organising illegal demonstrations and sentenced to another 20 days in jail.

2019 Moscow City Duma elections

Glej tudi: 2019 Moscow City Duma election in 2019 Moscow protests

Rally for right to vote in Moscow (10 August 2019)

During the 2019 Moscow City Duma election Navalny supported independent candidates, most of whom were not allowed to participate in the elections, which led to mass street protests. In July 2019, Navalny was arrested, first for ten days, and then, almost immediately, for 30 days. On the evening of 28 July, he was hospitalized with severe damage to his eyes and skin. At the hospital, he was diagnosed with an "allergy," although this diagnosis was disputed by Anastasia Vasilieva, an ophthalmologist who previously treated Navalny after a chemical attack by an alleged protester in 2017. Vasilieva questioned the diagnosis and suggested the possibility that Navalny's condition was the result of "the damaging effects of undetermined chemicals". On 29 July 2019, Navalny was discharged from hospital and taken back to prison, despite the objections of his personal physician who questioned the hospital's motives. Supporters of Navalny and journalists near the hospital were attacked by the police and many were detained. In response, he initiated the Smart voting project.

2020 constitutional referendum

The results of the Russian constitutional vote in 2020

Glej tudi: 2020 Russian constitutional referendum

Navalny campaigned against the vote on constitutional amendments that took place on 1 July, calling it a "coup" and a "violation of the constitution". He also said that the changes would allow President Putin to become "president for life". After the results were announced, he called them a "big lie" that did not reflect public opinion. The reforms include an amendment allowing Putin to serve another two terms in office (until 2036), after his current term ends.

Anti-corruption investigations

Glej tudi: Anti-Corruption Foundation

In 2008, Navalny invested 300,000 rubles in stocks of 5 oil and gas companies: Rosneft, Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, and Surgutneftegas, thus becoming an activist shareholder. As such, he began to aim at making the financial assets of these companies transparent. This is required by law, but there are allegations that high-level managers of these companies are involved in theft and resisting transparency. Other activities deal with wrongdoings by Russian police, such as Sergei Magnitsky's case.

In November 2010, Navalny published confidential documents about Transneft's auditing. According to Navalny's blog, about 4 billion dollars were stolen by Transneft's leaders during the construction of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean oil pipeline. In December, Navalny announced the launch of the RosPil project, which seeks to bring to light corrupt practices in the government procurement process. The project takes advantage of existing procurement regulation that requires all government requests for tender to be posted online. Information about winning bids must be posted online as well. The name RosPil is a pun on the slang term "raspil" (wikt:ru:распил) (literally "sawing"), implying the embezzlement of state funds.

In May 2011, Navalny launched RosYama (literally "Russian Hole"), a project that allowed individuals to report potholes and track government responses to complaints. In August, Navalny published papers related to a scandalous real estate deal between the Hungarian and Russian governments. According to the papers, Hungary sold a former embassy building in Moscow for US$21 million to an offshore company of Viktor Vekselberg, who immediately resold it to the Russian government for US$116 million. Irregularities in the paper trail implied collusion. Three Hungarian officials responsible for the deal were detained in February 2011. It is unclear whether any official investigation was conducted on the Russian side.

In February 2012, Navalny concluded that Russian federal money going to Ramzan Kadyrov's Chechen Interior Ministry was being spent "in a totally shadowy and fraudulent way." In May, Navalny accused Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov of corruption, stating that companies owned by Roman Abramovich and Alisher Usmanov had transferred tens of millions of dollars to Shuvalov's company, allowing Shuvalov to share in the profit from Usmanov's purchase of the British steel company Corus. Navalny posted scans of documents to his blog showing the money transfers. Usmanov and Shuvalov stated the documents Navalny had posted were legitimate, but that the transaction had not violated Russian law. "I unswervingly followed the rules and principles of conflict of interest," said Shuvalov. "For a lawyer, this is sacred". In July, Navalny posted documents on his blog allegedly showing that Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Investigative Committee of Russia, owned an undeclared business in the Czech Republic. The posting was described by the Financial Times as Navalny's "answering shot" for having had his emails leaked during his arrest in the previous month.

The Levada Center survey showed that 58% of surveyed Russians supported the 2017 Russian protests against government corruption.

In August 2018, Navalny alleged that Viktor Zolotov stole at least US$29 million from procurement contracts for the National Guard of Russia. Shortly after his allegations against Zolotov, Navalny was imprisoned for staging protests in January 2018. Subsequently, Viktor Zolotov published a video message on 11 September challenging Navalny to a duel and promising to make "good, juicy mincemeat" of him.

Medvedev

In March 2017, Navalny published the investigation He Is Not Dimon to You, accusing Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev of corruption. The authorities either ignored the accusation or argued that it was made by a "convicted criminal" and not worth comment. On 26 March, Navalny organized a series of anti-corruption rallies in cities across Russia. In some cities, the rallies were sanctioned by authorities, but in others, including Moscow and Saint Petersburg, they were not allowed. The Moscow police said that 500 people had been detained, but according to the human-rights group OVD-Info, 1,030 people were detained in Moscow alone, including Navalny himself. On 27 March, he was fined 20,000 rubles minimum for organizing an illegal protest, and jailed for 15 days for resisting arrest.

Putin

On 19 January 2021, two days after he was detained by Russian authorities upon his return to Russia, an investigation by Navalny and the FBK was published accusing President Vladimir Putin of using fraudulently obtained funds to build a massive estate for himself near the town of Gelendzhik in Krasnodar Krai, in what he called "the world's biggest bribe". The estate was first reported on in 2010 after the businessman Sergei Kolesnikov, who was involved in the project, gave details about it. According to Navalny, the estate is 39 times the size of Monaco, with the Federal Security Service (FSB) owning 70 square kilometers of land around the palace, and the estate cost over 100 billion rubles ($1.35 billion) to construct. It also showed aerial footage of the estate via a drone, and a detailed floorplan of the palace that Navalny and the FBK said was given by a contractor, which was compared to photographs from inside the palace that were leaked onto the Internet in 2011. Using the floorplan, computer-generated visualizations of the palace interior were also shown.

There are impregnable fences, its own port, its own security, a church, its own permit system, a no-fly zone, and even its own border checkpoint. It is absolutely a separate state within Russia.

— Alexei Anatolievich Navalny

This investigation also detailed an elaborate corruption scheme allegedly involving Putin's inner circle that allowed Putin to hide billions of dollars to build the estate. Navalny's team also said that it managed to confirm reporting about Putin's alleged lovers Svetlana Krivonogikh and Alina Kabaeva. Navalny's video on YouTube garnered over 20 million views in less than a day, and over 92 million after a week. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov in a press conference called the investigation a "scam" and said that citizens should "think before transferring money to such crooks".

Putin denied ownership of the palace and the oligarch Arkady Rotenberg claimed ownership.

Criminal cases

Kirovles case

Case

Navalny in court as part of the Kirovles trial

On 30 July 2012, the Investigative Committee charged Navalny with embezzlement. The committee stated that he had conspired to steal timber from Kirovles, a state-owned company in Kirov Oblast, in 2009, while acting as an adviser to Kirov's governor Nikita Belykh. Investigators had closed a previous probe into the claims for lack of evidence. Navalny was released on his own recognizance but instructed not to leave Moscow.

Navalny described the charges as "weird" and unfounded. He stated that authorities "are doing it to watch the reaction of the protest movement and of Western public opinion [...] So far they consider both of these things acceptable and so they are continuing along this line". His supporters protested before the Investigative Committee offices.

In April 2013, Loeb & Loeb LLP issued "An Analysis of the Russian Federation's prosecutions of Alexei Navalny", a paper detailing Investigative Committee accusations. The paper concludes that "the Kremlin has reverted to misuse of the Russian legal system to harass, isolate and attempt to silence political opponents".

Conviction and release

The Kirovles trial commenced in the city of Kirov on 17 April 2013. On 18 July, Navalny was sentenced to five years in jail for embezzlement. He was found guilty of misappropriating about 16 million rubles' ($500,000) worth of lumber from a state-owned company. The sentence read by the judge Sergey Blinov was textually the same as the request of the prosecutor, with the only exception that Navalny was given five years, and the prosecution requested six years.

"Enough of fake cases". The protest against the verdict in Moscow, 18 July 2013

Later that evening, the Prosecutor's Office appealed Navalny and Ofitserov jail sentences, arguing that until the higher court affirmed the sentence, the sentence was invalid. The next morning, the appeal was granted. Navalny and Ofitserov were released on 19 July, awaiting the hearings of the higher court. The prosecutor's requested decision was described as "unprecedented" by experts.

Probation

The prison sentence was suspended by a court in Kirov on 16 October 2013, still being a burden for his political future.

Review of the sentence

On 23 February 2016, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Russia had violated Navalny's right to a fair trial, and ordered the government to pay him 56,000 euros in legal costs and damages.

On 16 November 2016, Russia's Supreme Court overturned the 2013 sentence, sending the verdict back to the Leninsky District Court in Kirov for review.

On 8 February 2017, the Leninsky district court of Kirov repeated its sentence of 2013 and charged Navalny with a five-year suspended sentence. Navalny announced that he will pursue the annulment of the sentence that clearly contradicts the decision of ECHR.

Yves Rocher case and home arrest

Case

In 2008, Oleg Navalny made an offer to Yves Rocher Vostok, the Eastern European subsidiary of Yves Rocher between 2008 and 2012, to accredit Glavpodpiska, which was created by Navalny, with delivering duties. On 5 August, the parties signed a contract. To fulfill the obligations under the agreement, Glavpodpiska outsourced the task to sub-suppliers, AvtoSAGA and Multiprofile Processing Company (MPC). In November and December 2012, the Investigating Committee interrogated and questioned Yves Rocher Vostok. On 10 December, Bruno Leproux, general director of Yves Rocher Vostok, filed to the Investigative Committee, asking to investigate if the Glavpodpiska subscription company had damaged Yves Rocher Vostok, and the Investigative Committee initiated a case.

The prosecution claimed Glavpodpiska embezzled money by taking duties and then redistributing them to other companies for lesser amounts of money, and collecting the surplus: 26.7 million rubles ($540,000) from Yves Rocher Vostok, and 4.4 million rubles from the MPC. The funds were claimed to be subsequently legalized by transferring them on fictitious grounds from a fly-by-night company to Kobyakovskaya Fabrika Po Lozopleteniyu, a willow weaving company founded by Navalny and operated by his parents. Navalnys denied the charges. The brothers' lawyers claimed, the investigators "added phrases like 'bearing criminal intentions' to a description of regular entrepreneurial activity". According to Oleg Navalny's lawyer, Glavpodpiska did not just collect money, it controlled provision of means of transport, execution of orders, collected and expedited production to the carriers, and was responsible before clients for terms and quality of executing orders.

Yves Rocher denied that they had any losses, as did the rest of the witnesses, except the Multiprofile Processing Company CEO Sergei Shustov, who said he had learned about his losses from an investigator and believed him, without making audits. Both brothers and their lawyers claimed Alexei Navalny did not participate in the Glavpodpiska operations, and witnesses all stated they had never encountered Alexei Navalny in person before the trial.

Home arrest and limitations

Following the imputed violation of travel restrictions, Navalny was placed under house arrest and prohibited from communicating with anyone other than his family, lawyers, and investigators on 28 February 2014. Navalny claimed the arrest was politically motivated, and he filed a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights. On 7 July, he declared the complaint had been accepted and given priority; the court compelled the Government of Russia to provide answers to a questionnaire.

The home arrest, in particular, prohibited usage of the Internet; however, new posts were released under his social media accounts after the arrest was announced. A 5 March post claimed the accounts were controlled by his Anti-Corruption Foundation teammates and his wife Yulia. On 13 March, his LiveJournal blog was blocked in Russia, because, according to the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor), "functioning of the given web page breaks the regulation of the juridical decision of the bail hearing of a citizen against whom a criminal case has been initiated". Navalny's associates started a new blog, navalny.com, and the LiveJournal blog was eventually abolished, with the last post published on 9 July.

The home arrest was eased a number of times: On 21 August, Navalny was allowed to communicate with his co-defendants; a journalist present in the courthouse at the moment confirmed Navalny was allowed to communicate with "anyone but the Yves Rocher case witnesses". On 10 October, his right to communicate with the press was confirmed by another court, and he was allowed to make comments on the case in media (Navalny's plea not to prolong the arrest was, however, rejected). On 19 December, he was allowed to mail correspondence to authorities and international courts. Navalny again pleaded not to prolong the arrest, but the plea was rejected again.

Conviction

The verdict was announced on 30 December 2014. Both brothers were found guilty of fraud against MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok and money laundering, and were convicted under Articles 159.4 §§ 2 and 3 and 174.1 § 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code. Alexei Navalny was given 3½ years of suspended sentence, and Oleg Navalny was sentenced to 3½ years in prison and was arrested after the verdict was announced; both had to pay a fine of 500,000 rubles and a compensation to the Multiprofile Processing Company (MPK) of over 4 million rubles. In the evening, several thousand protesters gathered in the center of Moscow. Navalny broke his home arrest to attend the rally and was immediately arrested by the police and brought back home.

Both brothers filed complaints to the European Court of Human Rights: Oleg's was communicated and given priority; Alexei's was reviewed in the context of the previous complaint related to this case and the Government of Russia had been "invited to submit further observations". The second instance within the country confirmed the verdict, only releasing Alexei from the responsibility to pay his fine. Both prosecutors and defendants were not satisfied with this decision.

ECHR

On 17 October 2017, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Navalny's conviction for fraud and money laundering "was based on an unforeseeable application of criminal law and that the proceedings were arbitrary and unfair." The Court found that the domestic court's decisions had been arbitrary and manifestly unreasonable. ECHR found the Russian courts' decisions violated articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. On 15 November 2018, the Grand Chamber upheld the decision.

Indemnification

After the Yves Rocher case, Navalny had to pay a compensation of 4.4 million rubles. He declared the case was "a frame up", but he added he would pay the sum as this could affect granting his brother's parole. On 7 October 2015, Alexei's lawyer announced the defendant willingly paid 2.9 million and requested an installment plan for the rest of the sum. The request was granted, except the term was contracted from the requested five months to two, and a part of the sum declared paid (900,000 rubles; arrested from Navalny's banking account) was not yet received by the police; the prosecutors declared that may happen because of inter-process delays.

Later that month, Kirovles sued Navalny for the 16.1 million rubles' declared pecuniary injury; Navalny declared he had not expected the suit, as Kirovles did not initiate it during the 2012–2013 trial. On 23 October, a court resolved the said sum should be paid by the three defendants. The court denied the defendants' motion 14.7 million had already been paid by that point; the verdict and the payment sum were justified by a ruling by a Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Navalny declared he could not cover the requested sum; he called the suit a "drain-dry strategy" by authorities.

Other cases

In late December 2012, Russia's federal Investigative Committee asserted that Allekt, an advertising company headed by Navalny, defrauded the Union of Right Forces (SPS) political party in 2007 by taking 100 million rubles ($3.2 million) payment for advertising and failing to honor its contract. If charged and convicted, Navalny could be jailed for up to 10 years. "Nothing of the sort happened—he committed no robbery", Leonid Gozman, a former SPS official, was quoted as saying. Earlier in December, "the Investigative Committee charged [...] Navalny and his brother Oleg with embezzling 55 million rubles ($1.76 million) in 2008–2011 while working in a postal business". Navalny, who denied the allegations in the two previous cases, sought to laugh off news of the third inquiry with a tweet stating "Fiddlesticks [...]".

In April 2020 Yandex search engine started artificially placing negative commentary about Navalny on the top positions in its search results for his name. Yandex declared this was part of an "experiment" and returned to presenting organic search results.

Navalny alleged that Russian billionaire and businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin was linked to a company called Moskovsky Shkolnik (Moscow schoolboy) that had supplied poor quality food to schools which had caused a dysentery outbreak. In April 2019, Moskovsky Shkolnik filed a lawsuit against Navalny. In October 2019, the Moscow Arbitration Court ordered Navalny to pay 29.2 million rubles. Navalny said that "Cases of dysentery were proven using documents. But it's us that has to pay." Prigozhin was quoted by the press service of his catering company Concord Management and Consulting on 25 August 2020 as saying that he intended to enforce a court decision that required Navalny, his associate Lyubov Sobol and his Anti-Corruption Foundation to pay 88 million rubles in damages to the Moskovsky Shkolnik company over a video investigation.

By 2019, Navalny had won six complaints against Russian authorities in the ECHR for a total of €225,000.

Poisoning

Poisoning and recovery

On 20 August 2020, Navalny fell ill during a flight from Tomsk to Moscow and was hospitalised in the Emergency City Clinical Hospital No. 1 in Omsk (Городская клиническая больница скорой медицинской помощи №1), where the plane had made an emergency landing. The change in his condition on the plane was sudden and violent, and video footage showed crewmembers on the flight scurrying towards him as he screamed loudly. Later, he said that he was not screaming from pain, but from the knowledge that he was dying.

Afterward, his spokeswoman, Kira Yarmysh, said that he was in a coma and on a ventilator in the Omsk hospital. She also said that since he arose that morning, Navalny had consumed nothing but a cup of tea, acquired at the airport. It was initially suspected that something was mixed into his drink, and physicians stated that a "toxin mixed into a hot drink would be rapidly absorbed". The hospital said that he was in a stable but serious condition. Although staff initially acknowledged that Navalny had probably been poisoned, after numerous police personnel appeared outside Navalny's room, the medical staff was less forthcoming. The Omsk hospital's deputy chief physician later told reporters that poisoning was "one scenario among many" being considered.

A plane was sent from Germany to evacuate Navalny from Russia for treatment at the Charité Hospital in Berlin, even though the doctors treating him in Omsk initially declared he was too sick to be transported, they later released him. On 24 August, the doctors in Germany made an announcement, confirming that Navalny had been poisoned with a cholinesterase inhibitor.

Ivan Zhdanov, chief of Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation, said that Navalny could have been poisoned because of one of the foundation's investigations. On 2 September, the German government announced that Navalny was poisoned with a Novichok nerve agent, from the same family of nerve agents that was used to poison Sergei Skripal and his daughter. International officials said that they had obtained "unequivocal proof" from toxicology tests, and have called on the Russian government for an explanation. On 7 September, German doctors announced that he was out of the coma. On 15 September, Navalny's spokeswoman said that Navalny would return to Russia. On 17 September, Navalny's team said that traces of the nerve agent used to poison Navalny was detected on an empty water bottle from his hotel room in Tomsk, suggesting that he was possibly poisoned before leaving the hotel. On 23 September, Navalny was discharged from hospital after his condition had sufficiently improved. On 6 October OPCW confirmed presence of cholinesterase inhibitor from the Novichok group in Navalny's blood and urine samples.

On 14 December, a joint investigation by The Insider and Bellingcat in co-operation with CNN and Der Spiegel was published, which implicated agents from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) in Navalny's poisoning. The investigation detailed a special unit of the FSB, which specialises in chemical substances, and the investigators then tracked members of the unit, using telecom and travel data. According to the investigation, Navalny was under surveillance by a group of operatives from the unit for 3 years and there may have been earlier attempts to poison Navalny. In an interview with Spanish newspaper El País, Navalny said that "It is difficult for me to understand exactly what is going on in [Putin's] mind. ... 20 years of power would spoil anyone and make them crazy. He thinks he can do whatever he wants."

On 21 December 2020 Navalny released a video that shows him impersonating a Russian security official, in order to speak by phone, with a man who was identified by some investigative news media as a chemical weapons expert named Konstantin Kudryavtsev. The man said that the poison had been in Navalny's clothing, and especially concentrated in his underwear and that Navalny would have died if not for the plane's emergency landing and quick response from an ambulance crew on the runway.

In January 2021, Bellingcat, The Insider and Der Spiegel linked the unit that tracked Navalny to the deaths of other activists including Timur Kuashev in 2014 and Ruslan Magomedragimov in 2015 as well as the politician Nikita Isayev in 2019. In February, another joint investigation said that Vladimir Kara-Murza was followed by the same unit before his suspected poisonings.

Return and imprisonment

Glej tudi: 2021 Russian protests

On 17 January 2021, Navalny returned to Russia by plane from Germany, arriving at Sheremetyevo International Airport in Moscow after the flight was diverted from Vnukovo Airport. At passport control, he was detained. The Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) confirmed his detention and said that he would remain in custody until the court hearing. Prior to his return, the FSIN had said that Navalny might face jail time upon his arrival in Moscow for violating the terms of his probation by leaving Russia, saying it would be "obliged" to detain him once he returned; in 2014, Navalny received a suspended sentence in the Yves Rocher case, which he called politically motivated and in 2017, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Navalny was unfairly convicted. Amnesty International declared Navalny to be a prisoner of conscience and called on the Russian authorities to release him. A court decision on 18 January ordered the detention of Navalny until 15 February for violating his parole. A makeshift court was set up in the police station where Navalny was being held. Another hearing would later be held to determine whether his suspended sentence should be replaced with a jail term. Navalny described the procedure as "ultimate lawlessness" and called on his supporters to take to the streets. Human Rights Centre Memorial recognized Navalny as a political prisoner. The next day, while in jail, an investigation by Navalny and the FBK was published accusing President Vladimir Putin of corruption. The investigation and his arrest led to mass protests across Russia beginning on 23 January 2021.

A Moscow court on 2 February replaced Navalny's three and a half-year suspended sentence with a prison sentence, minus the amount of time he spent under house arrest, meaning he would spend over two and half years in a corrective labour colony. The verdict was condemned by the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France and others as well as the EU. Immediately after the verdict was announced, protests in a number of Russian cities were held and met with a harsh police crackdown. Navalny later returned to court for a trial on slander charges, where he was accused of defaming a World War II veteran who took part in a promotional video backing the constitutional amendments last year. The case was launched in June 2020 after Navalny called those who took part in the video "corrupt lackeys" and "traitors". Navalny called the case politically motivated and accused authorities of using the case to smear his reputation. Although the charge is punishable by up to two years in prison if proven, his lawyer said that Navalny cannot face a custodial sentence because the law was changed to make it a jailable offence after the alleged crime had taken place.

The European Court of Human Rights ruled on 16 February that the Russian government should release Navalny immediately, with the court saying that the resolution was made in "regard to the nature and extent of risk to the applicant's life". Navalny's lawyers applied to the court for an "interim measure" for his release on 20 January after his detention. However Russian officials indicated that they would not comply with the decision. Justice Minister Konstantin Chuychenko called the measure a "flagrant intervention in the operation of a judicial system of a sovereign state" as well as "unreasonable and unlawful", claiming that it did not "contain any reference to any fact or any norm of the law, which would have allowed the court to take this decision". In December 2020, a series of laws were also passed and signed that gave the constitution precedence over rulings made by international bodies as well international treaties. A few days later, a Moscow court rejected Navalny's appeal and upheld his prison sentence, however it reduced his sentence by six weeks after deciding to count his time under house arrest as part of his time served. Another court convicted Navalny on slander charges against the World War II veteran, fining him 850,000 rubles ($11,500).

In February 2021, Amnesty International stripped Navalny of "prisoner of conscience" status, due to lobbying about videos and pro-nationalist statements he made in the past that allegedly constitute hate speech. This designation was then reinstated in May 2021: the international organization stated that the withdrawal of the "prisoner of conscience" designation had been used as a pretext by the Government of the Russian Federation to further violate Navalny's human rights.

Navalny was reported on 28 February to have recently arrived at the Pokrov correctional colony in Vladimir Oblast, a prison where Dmitry Demushkin and Konstantin Kotov were also jailed. In early March, the European Union and United States imposed sanctions on senior Russian officials in response to Navalny's poisoning and imprisonment.

In March, while in prison, Navalny in a formal complaint accused authorities of torture by depriving him of sleep, where he is considered a flight risk by authorities. Navalny told lawyers that he is woken up eight times a night by guards announcing to a camera that he is in his prison cell. A lawyer of Navalny said that he is suffering from health problems, including a loss of sensation in his spine and legs, and that prison authorities denied Navalny's requests for a civilian physician, claiming his health was "satisfactory". On 31 March, Navalny announced a hunger strike to demand proper medical treatment. On 6 April, six doctors, including Navalny's personal physician, Anastasia Vasilyeva, and two CNN correspondents, were arrested outside the prison when they attempted to visit Navalny whose health significantly deteriorated. On 7 April 2021, Navalny's attorneys claimed he had suffered two spinal disc herniations and had lost feeling in his hands, prompting criticism from the U.S. government. Agnès Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International accused Vladimir Putin of slowly killing Alexei Navalny through torture and inhumane treatment in prison. He also complained that he was not allowed to read newspapers or have any books including a copy of the Quran that he planned to study.

The Moscow prosecutor office requested the Moscow City Court on 16 April to designate organizations linked to Navalny including the FBK and his headquarters as extremist organizations, claiming: "Under the disguise of liberal slogans, these organizations are engaged in creating conditions for the destabilization of the social and socio-political situation." In response, Navalny aide Leonid Volkov stated: "Putin has just announced full-scale mass political repression in Russia."

On 17 April, it was reported that Navalny was in immediate need of medical attention. Navalny's personal doctor Anastasia Vasilyeva and three other doctors, including cardiologist Yaroslav Ashikhmin, asked prison officials to grant them immediate access, stating on social media that "Our patient can die any minute", due to an increased risk of a fatal cardiac arrest or kidney failure "at any moment". Test results obtained by Navalny's lawyers showed heightened levels of potassium in the blood, which can bring on cardiac arrest, and sharply elevated creatinine levels, indicating impaired kidneys. Navalny's results showed blood potassium levels of 7.1 mmol; blood potassium levels higher than 6.0 mmol (millimoles) per liter usually require immediate treatment.

Later that night, an open letter, addressed to Putin and open for Russian citizens to sign, was signed and published by 11 politicians representing several regional parliaments, demanding an independent doctor be allowed to visit Navalny, and for a review and cancellation of all of his criminal cases. "We regard what is happening in relation to Navalny as an attempt on the life of a politician, committed out of personal and political hatred," says the letter, "You, the President of the Russian Federation, personally bear responsibility for the life of Alexey Navalny on the territory of the Russian Federation, including in prison facilities – [you bear this responsibility] to Navalny himself, to his relatives, and to the whole world." Among the signatories are chairman of the Pskov regional branch of the Yabloko party, the deputy of the regional assembly Lev Schlosberg, the deputy from Karelia, the ex-chairman of Yabloko Emilia Slabunova, and the deputy of the Moscow City Duma Yevgeny Stupin.

The following day, his daughter called on Russian prison authorities to let her father be checked by doctors in a tweet written from Stanford University, where she is a student. Prominent celebrities such as J.K. Rowling and Jude Law also addressed a letter to Russian authorities asking to provide Navalny with proper medical treatment. U.S. president Joe Biden called his treatment "totally unfair" and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that the Kremlin had been warned "that there will be consequences if Mr. Navalny dies." The European Union's head diplomat Josep Borrell stated that the organization held the Russian government accountable for Navalny's health conditions. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, also expressed her concern for his health. However, Russian authorities rebuked such concerns by foreign countries. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Russian prison officials are monitoring Navalny's health, not the president.

On 19 April, Navalny was moved from prison to a hospital for convicts, according to the Russian prison service, for "vitamin therapy". On 23 April, Navalny announced that he was ending his hunger strike on advice of his doctors and as he felt his demands had been partially met. His newspapers are still being censored as articles are cut out before the newspaper is given to him.

On 26 April, Moscow's prosecutor office ordered Navalny's network of regional offices, including those of the FBK, to cease its activities, pending a court ruling on whether to designate them as extremist organizations. His ally Leonid Volkov explained that it will limit many of the group's activities as prosecutors seek to label the Foundation as "extremists". The move was condemned by Germany as well as Amnesty International, which, in a statement, said: "The objective is clear: to raze Alexei Navalny's movement to the ground while he languishes in prison." On 29 April, Navalny's team announced that the political network would be dissolved, in advance of a court ruling in May expected to designate it as extremist. According to Volkov, the headquarters would be transformed into independent political organizations "which will deal with investigations and elections, public campaigns and rallies". On the same day, his allies said that a new criminal case had been opened against Navalny, for allegedly setting up a non-profit organisation that infringed on the rights of citizens. The next day, the leader of Team 29, Ivan Pavlov, who also represents Navalny's team in the extremism case, was detained in Moscow. On 30 April, the financial monitoring agency added Navalny's regional campaign offices to a list of "terrorists and extremists." On 20 May, the head of the Russian prison system and Navalny's ally Ivan Zhdanov reported that Navalny had "more or less" recovered and that his health was generally satisfactory. On 7 June, Navalny was returned to prison after fully recovering from the effects of the hunger strike.

On 9 June, Navalny's political network, including his headquarters and the FBK, were designated as extremist organizations and liquidated by the Moscow City Court. Vyacheslav Polyga, judge of Moscow City Court, upheld the administrative claim of the prosecutor of Moscow city Denis Popov and, rejecting all the petitions of the defense, decided to recognize Anti-Corruption Foundation as extremist organization, to liquidate it and to confiscate its assets; similar decision had been taken against Citizens’ Rights Protection Foundation; the activity of the Alexei Navalny staff was prohibited (case №3а-1573/2021). Case hearing was held in camera because, as indicated by advocate Ilia Novikov, the case file including the text of the administrative claim was classified as state secret. According to advocate Ivan Pavlov, Navalny was not the party to the proceedings and the judge refused to give him such status; at the hearing, the prosecutor stated that defendants are extremist organizations because they want the change of power in Russia and they promised to help participants of the protest with payment of administrative and criminal fines and with making a complaints to the European Court of Human Rights. On 4 August 2021, First Appellate Ordinary Court located in Moscow upheld the decision of the court of first instance (case №66а-3553/2021) and this decision entered into force that day.

In October 2021, the Russian prison commission designated Navalny as a "terrorist."

Reception

Political activities

Navalny, his wife Yulia and Russian opposition politician Ilya Yashin, 12 June 2013

In October 2010, Navalny was the winner of the unofficial online elections for mayor of Moscow, held by Kommersant and Gazeta.Ru. He received about 30,000 votes, or 45%, with the closest rival being "Against all candidates" with some 9,000 votes (14%), followed by former First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Boris Nemtsov with 8,000 votes (12%) out of a total of about 67,000 votes.

The reaction to Navalny's actual mayoral election result in 2013, where he came second, was mixed: Nezavisimaya Gazeta declared, "The voting campaign turned a blogger into a politician", and following an October 2013 Levada Center poll that showed Navalny made it to the list of potential presidential candidates among Russians, receiving a rating of 5%, Konstantin Kalachev, the leader of the Political Expert Group, declared 5% was not the limit for Navalny, and unless something extraordinary happened, he could become "a pretender for a second place in the presidential race". On the other hand, The Washington Post published a column by Milan Svolik that stated the election was fair so the Sobyanin could show a clean victory, demoralizing the opposition, which could otherwise run for street protests. Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated on 12 September, "His momentary result cannot testify his political equipment and does not speak of him as of a serious politician".

When referring to Navalny, Putin never actually pronounced his name in public, referring to him as a "mister" or the like; Julia Ioffe took it for a sign of weakness before the opposition politician, and Peskov later stated Putin never pronounced his name in order not to "give [Navalny] a part of his popularity". In July 2015, Bloomberg's sources "familiar with the matter" declared there was an informal prohibition from the Kremlin for senior Russian officials from mentioning Navalny's name. Peskov rejected the assumption there is such a ban; however, in doing so, he did not mention Navalny's name either.

Ratings

Rally concert in support of Navalny, 6 September 2013

In a 2013 Levada Center poll, Navalny's recognition among the Russian population stood at 37%. Out of those who were able to recognize Navalny, 14% would either "definitely" or "probably" support his presidential run.

The Levada Center also conducted another survey, which was released on 6 April 2017, showing Navalny's recognition among the Russian population at 55%. Out of those who recognized Navalny, 4% would "definitely" vote for him and 14% would "probably" vote for him in the presidential election. In another poll carried out by the same pollster in August 2020, 4% of respondents said that they trusted Navalny the most (out of a list of politicians), an increase from 2% in the previous month.

According to polls conducted by the Levada Center in September 2020, 20% of Russians approve Navalny's activities, 50% disapprove, and 18% had never heard of him. Out of those who were able to recognize Navalny, 10% said that they have "respect" for him, 8% have sympathy and 15% "could not say anything bad" about him. 31% are "neutral" towards him, 14% "could not say anything good" about him and 10% dislike him.

Criminal cases

During and after the Kirovles trial, a number of prominent people expressed support to Navalny and/or condemned the trial. The last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called it "proof that we do not have independent courts". Former Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin stated that it was "looking less like a punishment than an attempt to isolate him from social life and the electoral process". It was also criticized by novelist Boris Akunin, and jailed Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who called it similar to the treatment of political opponents during the Soviet era.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the nationalist LDPR, called the verdict "a direct warning to our 'fifth column'", and added, "This will be the fate of everyone who is connected with the West and works against Russia". A variety of state officials condemned the verdict. United States Department of State Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf stated that the United States was "very disappointed by the conviction and sentencing of opposition leader Aleksey Navalniy". The spokesperson for European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton said that the outcome of the trial "raises serious questions as to the state of the rule of law in Russia". Andreas Schockenhoff, Germany's Commissioner for German-Russian Coordination, stated, "For us, it's further proof of authoritarian policy in Russia, which doesn't allow diversity and pluralism". The New York Times commented in response to the verdict that "President Vladimir Putin of Russia actually seems weak and insecure".

The verdict in the case of Yves Rocher caused similar reactions. According to Alexei Venediktov, the verdict was "unfair", Oleg Navalny was taken "hostage", while Alexei was not jailed to avoid "furious reaction" from Putin, which was caused by the change of measure of restraint after the Kirovles trial. A number of deputies appointed by United Russia and LDPR found the verdict too mild. Experts interrogated by BBC Russian Service expressed reactions close to the political positions their organizations generally stand on. The spokesperson for EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini stated the same day that the sentence was likely to be politically motivated.

Public opinion varied over time: According to Levada Center, 20% of people thought the Kirovles case had been caused by an actual violation of law, while 54% agreed the rationale beyond the case was his anti-corruption activity in May 2011. In May 2013, the shares of people who held these opinions were 28% and 47%, correspondingly; however, in September 2013, the shares were 35% and 45%. The organization suggested this had been caused by corresponding coverage in media. By September 2014, the percentages had undergone further changes, and equaled 37% and 38%. The center also stated the share of those who found the result of another criminal case against him was unfair and Navalny was not guilty dropped from 13% in July 2013 to 5% in January 2015, and the number of those who found the verdict was too tough also fell from 17% to 9%. The share of those who found the verdict to be either fair or too mild was 26% in July 2013, and has exceeded 35% since September 2013.

Political positions

A poster that won the Navalny contest "Against the party of crooks and thieves"

In February 2011, in an interview with the radio station finam.fm, Navalny called the main Russian party, United Russia, a "party of crooks and thieves". In May 2011, the Russian government began a criminal investigation into Navalny, widely described in media as "revenge", and by Navalny himself as "a fabrication by the security services". Meanwhile, "crooks and thieves" became a popular nickname for the party.

In 2011, Navalny stated that he considered himself a "nationalist democrat". He has participated in the annual "Russian march" from 2006, a parade uniting Russian nationalist groups of all stripes, and was one of the co-organizers of the 2011 march. His views about Russian nationalism evolved. In 2007, he released several anti-immigration videos in which one clip featured himself dressed as a dentist, who likened interethnic conflict in Russia to "cavities" and claimed that fascism can be stopped only by deporting migrants from Russia. Navalny stated "We have a right to be [ethnic] Russians in Russia. And we will defend this right." Navalny has still not removed the videos nor retracted his statements but according to Leonid Volkov, who runs the political-organizing part of Navalny's organization, Navalny has expressed regret for the videos. But he said later that "The basis of my approach is that you have to communicate with nationalists and educate them... I think it's very important to explain to them that the problem of illegal immigration is not solved by beating up migrants but by other, democratic means". Navalny has also called for ending federal subsidies to the "corrupt" and "ineffective" governments of Chechnya and other North Caucasus republics. In 2013, after ethnic riots in a Moscow district took place, which were sparked by a murder committed by a migrant, Navalny sympathized with the anti-immigration movement and commented that ethnic tensions and crimes are inevitable because of failing immigration policies by the state.

In early 2012, Navalny stated on Ukrainian TV, "Russian foreign policy should be maximally directed at integration with Ukraine and Belarus… In fact, we are one nation. We should enhance integration." During the same broadcast Navalny said to "No one wants to make an attempt to limit Ukraine's sovereignty".

In March 2014, after Russia's annexation of Crimea, Navalny urged further sanctions against officials and businessmen linked to Putin and proposed his own list of sanctions, saying that previous US and EU sanctions were "mocked". In October 2014, Navalny said in an interview that despite Crimea being illegally "seized", "the reality is that Crimea is now part of Russia". When asked if he would return Crimea to Ukraine if he became president, he said "Is Crimea some sort of sausage sandwich to be passed back and forth? I don't think so". He also said that a "normal referendum" would need to be held. Navalny also said that Putin's government should stop "sponsoring the war" in Donbas. Navalny has strongly criticized Vladimir Putin's policies in Ukraine: "Putin likes to speak about the 'Russian world' but he is actually making it smaller. In Belarus, they sing anti-Putin songs at football stadiums; in Ukraine they simply hate us. In Ukraine now, there are no politicians who do not have extreme anti-Russian positions. Being anti-Russian is the key to success now in Ukraine, and that is our fault".

In 2016, Navalny spoke against the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war, believing that there are internal problems in Russia that need to be dealt with rather than to get involved in foreign wars.

In 2017, Leonid Volkov, Navalny's chief of staff, said that Navalny's team supports the legalization of same-sex marriage.

In 2018, after the establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, an event labeled as the ending of more than three centuries of Russian spiritual and temporal control of the dominant faith in Ukraine, Navalny tweeted: "What took centuries to create has been destroyed by Putin and his idiots in four years...Putin is the enemy of the Russian World."

In June 2020, he spoke out in support of the Black Lives Matter protests against racism.

In July 2020, Navalny voiced his support for the protests in Khabarovsk and other cities in the Russian Far East and Siberia. He said that "Putin personally – and Putin's stooges who run the Far East – hate Khabarovsk region and its inhabitants because time and again, they lose elections there."

Awards and honours

Scenic viewpoint of Alexei Navalny in Prague, 2021

Navalny was named "Person of the Year 2009" by Russian business newspaper Vedomosti and by stock exchange observer Stock in Focus.

On 22 April 2010, Navalny was awarded the Finance magazine prize in the nomination "for protecting the rights of minority shareholders".

Navalny was a World Fellow at Yale University's World Fellows Program, aimed at "creating a global network of emerging leaders and to broaden international understanding" in 2010.

In 2011, Foreign Policy magazine named Navalny to the FP Top 100 Global Thinkers, along with Daniel Domscheit-Berg and Sami Ben Gharbia of Tunisia, for "shaping the new world of government transparency". FP picked him again in 2012. He was listed by Time magazine in 2012 as one of the world's 100 most influential people, the only Russian on the list. In 2013, Navalny came in at No. 48 among "world thinkers" in an online poll by the UK magazine Prospect.

In 2015, Alexei and Oleg Navalny were chosen to receive the "Prize of the Platform of European Memory and Conscience 2015". According to the Platform's statement, "The Members of the Platform have voted this year for the Navalny brothers, in recognition of their personal courage, struggle and sacrifices for upholding fundamental democratic values and freedoms in the Russian Federation today. By the award of the Prize, the Platform wishes to express its respect and support to Mr. Oleg Navalny whom the Platform considers a political prisoner, and to Mr. Alexei Navalny for his efforts to expose corruption, defend political pluralism and opposition to the mounting authoritarian regime in the Russian Federation".

In June 2017, Navalny was included Time magazine's list of the World's 25 Most Influential People on the Internet. In December 2017, he was named "Politician of the Year 2017" by Vedomosti.

He was named "Politician of the Year 2019" by readers of Vedomosti.

Navalny was nominated for the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize by multiple Norwegian members of parliament. An Internet petition to the Nobel Committee in support of Mr. Navalny's candidacy has been signed by over 38,000 people.

Following Navalny's imprisonment in February 2021, the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom awarded Navalny with the Boris Nemtsov Prize for Courage. A scenic viewpoint of Alexei Navalny was also set in Prague in direct view from the Russian Embassy, near Boris Nemtsov Square in front of the Russian Embassy and the Anna Politkovskaya Promenade.

On 8 June 2021, Navalny's daughter accepted the Moral Courage Award at the Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy on behalf of her father. Navalny dedicated the prize to political prisoners. In September 2021, Navalny was included in Time Magazine's list of the 100 most influential people. His second appearance on the list, having previous been included in 2012.

In September 2021, he was awarded the Knight of Freedom Award conferred by the Casimir Pulaski Foundation.

In October 2021, he received the Sakharov Prize, the European Parliament's annual human rights prize. David Sassoli, the President of the European Parliament, announced that the award was to recognise that Navalny "has fought tirelessly against the corruption of Vladimir Putin's regime. This cost him his liberty and nearly his life".

Later that same year, he also received a German prize for his efforts in sustaining freedom of expression - the M100 Media Award.

Family and personal life

Navalny and his wife Yulia

Navalny is married to Yulia Navalnaya and has two children, daughter Daria, currently an undergraduate student at Stanford University, and son Zakhar. Since 1998, he has lived in a three-room apartment in Maryino District in southeast Moscow.

Navalny is a Russian Orthodox Christian; previously an atheist, Navalny has said that turning to the Orthodox church has made him feel a "part of something large and universal."

See also

• 2017–2018 Russian protests
• 2019 Moscow protests
• List of designated prisoners of conscience
• List of people who survived assassination attempts
• 2021 Russian protests
• Poisoning of Alexei Navalny

Notes

Exchange rates used in the article

References

Bibliography

• Michnik, Adam; Navalny, Alexei (2015). Диалоги [Dialogues] (v ruščini). Novoye Izdatel'stvo. ISBN 978-5-98379-198-5. OCLC 1166734566.

Further reading

• Jan Matti Dollbaum (2020) "Protest trajectories in electoral authoritarianism: from Russia's 'For Fair Elections' movement to Alexei Navalny's presidential campaign". Post-Soviet Affairs.

External links

• (rusko)
• Navalny's page for the Yale World Fellows Program
• "Palace for Putin. History of the biggest bribery", a video released by Navalny on 19 January 2021, after returning to Moscow.

Funkcije v političnih strankah
Nova politična stranka	Leader of Russia of the Future 2013–present	Trenutni nosilec naziva

52. svetovni evharistični shod v Budimpešti

Hu: Predloga:Sportrendezvény infobox Az Eucharisztikus világkongresszus, más néven Nemzetközi Eucharisztikus Kongresszus a római katolikus egyház rendszeresen megrendezett, világméretű eseménysorozata, melynek célja az oltáriszentség megismerésének és tiszteletének elmélyítése. Szervezője a Nemzetközi Eucharisztikus Kongresszusok Pápai Bizottsága.

A más-más helyszínen meghirdetett kongresszusnak előre meghirdetett címe van, melyre előadásokkal készülnek, illetve sok közös imát tartanak, és szentségimádáson vesznek részt a hívők. Eleinte évente, kétévente, a második világháború óta leginkább négyévente (3–5) rendezik meg. A kongresszus igyekszik érthetőbbé tenni a Krisztus által az utolsó vacsorán meghirdetett áldozatbemutatást, és annak fontosságát, amiben esetenként segítségükre vannak az elismert oltáriszentség csodák is.

Az 1938-ban tartott (34.) eucharisztikus világkongresszust Budapesten rendezték meg, és 2021-ben ismét a magyar főváros adhat otthont az 52. Nemzetközi Eucharisztikus Kongresszusnak.

Történelem

Az Eucharisztia-tisztelet kialakulása

Az Eucharisztia saját ünnepe az Úrnapja (Corpus Domini), amit a világegyház a pünkösd nyolcadát követő csütörtökön tart. Számos országban ilyenkor körmenettel tisztelegnek Krisztus teste előtt, az átváltoztatott ostyát ilyenkor a pap az erre a célra kialakított díszes szentségmutatóba (monstrancia) helyezi, s baldachin alatt hordozza körbe a hívekkel együtt énekelve és imádkozva. Az Úrnapját először 1246-ban tartották meg Liège-ben, amikor egy apáca látomásának hatására a helyi főesperes, Jacques Pantaléon körmenetet rendelt el. Alig néhány évvel később Pantalèont IV. Orbán néven pápává választották, s az egyházfő 1264-es Transiturus című bullájában az egész világon elrendelte az Úrnapját, az ünnepi szertartásrend kidolgozását pedig Aquinói Szent Tamás végezte el. Az úrnap megünneplésének elterjedésével vált szokásossá az Oltáriszentség körülhordozása, de általánossá csak a 15. századtól lett.

Az ellenreformáció idejében az Eucharisztia tisztelete újra megerősödött, mintegy ellenpéldául a szentséget egészen másképp értelmező protestánsok számára. A protestánsok Úrvacsorának nevezik, és nem is tekintik Krisztus valóságos jelenlétének, felfogásuk szerint a kenyér és bor csak jelkép. Míg az ellenreformáció fellendítette az Eucharisztia-tiszteletet, népszerűsítette a hívők gyakori szentáldozáshoz járulását, az egyházban felbukkanó szélsőséges csoport, a janzenisták éppen hogy az életben egy-két alkalommal történő áldozást propagálták. A Cornelius Jansen leuveni teológiatanár és Michel De Bay yperni püspök nevével fémjelzett, nem csekély népszerűségnek örvendő mozgalom vélekedése szerint Krisztus közöttünk lévő jelenléte olyan fenséges és megrendítő titok, hogy a gyarló földi ember nem is méltó arra, hogy megközelítse, „táplálkozzon vele”. A terjedő janzenista nézetek negatív hatásának a jezsuiták szolgáltattak ellenpólust a Jézus szíve-tisztelet meghonosításával.

A felvilágosodás, a francia forradalom és a liberalizmus egyre terjedő eszméi az Eucharisztia-tiszteletet némiképp elhalványították, ami a 19. század végén új erőre kapott. A vallást elvető államtól és a szekularizációtól idegenkedő papoknak és hívőknek egyre több társulatuk alakult a hitélet védelmére; imacsoportok, oltáregyletek jöttek létre Európa-szerte, az Eucharisztia tisztelete is fellendült. Míg Németországban javában dúlt a kultúrharc állam és egyház között, Franciaországban pedig az elvilágiasodott Harmadik Köztársaság egyre-másra hozta az egyházat ellehetetlenítő törvényeket, Lille-ben megtartották az első nemzetközi eucharisztikus kongresszust.

Az eucharisztikus kongresszusok története

19. század

Az eucharisztikus kongresszusok kezdeményezője Emilia Tamisier, egyszerű dél-franciaországi asszony volt, aki eleinte zarándoklatokat szervezett az Eucharisztia jegyében, első alkalommal 1874 júniusában Avignonba, majd egy hónappal később Arsba, Vianney Szent János egykori szolgálati helyére. A következő évben Douaiba gyűltek össze Tamisier asszony felhívására, a szervezők örömére ötvenezer hívő és öt püspök vett részt a zarándoklaton. E sikeren felbuzdulva a francia eucharisztikus mozgalom vezetői elhatározták, hogy a zarándoklatokat minden évben megtartják, s külön kongresszussal zárják le őket. Így került sor 1875 szeptemberében az első nemzeti eucharisztikus kongresszusra Faverney-ben, ám a folytatást a Harmadik Köztársaság egyházellenes intézkedéseivel megakadályozta. A kedvezőtlen légkör miatt csak 1881-ben került sor újabb eucharisztikus kongresszus megtartására az észak-franciaországi Lille-ben, ez volt az első, amelyik már a határokon is átívelt. A háromnapos ünnepség nagyjából úgy zajlott le, mint a későbbi kongresszusok; a szentmisékkel, szentségimádással és elmélkedéssel töltött napokat körmenet koronázta. A résztvevők javarésze Franciaországból vagy a szomszédos országokból jött, de nem elhanyagolható a Közép-Európából illetve Mexikóból és Chiléből érkezett zarándokok száma. A rendezők bíztak abban, hogy a kongresszusok sora már nem fog megszakadni, mint történt a faverney-i után, ezért állították fel az Állandó Nemzetközi Előkészítő Bizottságot, melynek első feje Lille ordináriusa, a cambray-i érsek lett.

Az első nemzetközi eucharisztikus kongresszusokat jobbára Franciaországban, vagy francia nyelvterületen tartották. Valóságos áttörésnek számított a nyolcadik, 1893-as jeruzsálemi kongresszus, nemcsak azért, mert az Oszmán Birodalomban rendezték, hanem mert itt képviseltette magát először a pápa követtel Benoit-Marie Langenieux bíboros személyében.

20. század

Az 1905-ös római világkongresszuson maga X. Piusz pápa, az Eucharisztia nagy tisztelője is részt vett, aki elhatározta, hogy ezután valamennyi világkongresszusra elküldi hivatalos követét. Fényes külsőségek között zajlott az 1912-es bécsi, szerényebb és inkább lelki megújulást hirdetve az 1913-as máltai és 1914-es lourdes-i, de sajnos az első világháború és az utána következő feszült nemzetközi helyzet miatt a következő kongresszust csak 1922-ben tartották meg, Rómában. 1926-ban Chicagóban rendezték meg az eucharisztikus világkongresszust, amely Gergely Jenő történész szavaival élve Predloga:Idézet2 A kongresszuson közel egymillióan járultak szentáldozáshoz, hatvanezer tagú kórus énekelt, a főünnepségeknek helyt adó stadionban a Szent Péter-bazilika főoltárának hű másolatánál mondták a szentmisét. Azonban nemcsak a minden képzeletet felülmúló külsőségek miatt jelentős a chicagói kongresszus, hanem mert magyar küldöttség is részt vett rajta Csernoch János prímás vezetésével. 1928-ban Sydney, 1930-ban, Hippói Szent Ágoston halálának 1500 éves jubileumára emlékezve Karthágó, 1932-ben pedig a Szent Patrik partraszállásának 1500. évfordulóját ünneplő Dublin adott otthont az eucharisztikus világkongresszusnak. Az 1934-es Buenos Aires-i kongresszus (32.) külön jelentős: itt képviselte először a pápát kúriai bíboros, Eugenio Pacelli bíboros-államtitkár személyében. 1937-ben a Fülöp-szigeteki Manilában gyűltek össze az Eucharisztia tiszteletére.

21. század

Az ötvenedik találkozót ismét Dublinban tartották, 2012. június 10. és 17. között, az 51-et 2016-ban a Fülöp-szigeteki Cebuban, ahol a pápa bejelentette, hogy az 52. Magyarországon, Budapesten lesz.

Eucharisztikus világkongresszusok Budapesten

1938

Spominski svetinji na Svetovni Evharistični kongres 1938

... in vsebina himne

bélyegkép|jobbra|260px|1938-as eucharisztikus világkongresszus emlékérme... [[Fájl:Eucharisztikus világkongresszus himnusza.jpg|jobbra|260px|bélyegkép|... és himnuszának szövege]]

Arra, hogy Budapest is rendezhessen eucharisztikus világkongresszust, az ötlet már Csernoch János és kísérete Chicagóból való hazatérte után felvetődött. Mintegy próbaként 1928-ban nemzeti eucharisztikus kongresszust tartottak Magyarországon, kétszázezer hívő részvételével, ennek sikerén felbuzdulva a püspöki kar a következő évi értekezletén hivatalosan is kezdett tárgyalni arról, hogy Magyarországon is tarthassanak eucharisztikus világkongresszust. Az 1929. március 13-án tartott püspökkari értekezleten az új esztergomi érsek, Serédi Jusztinián szorgalmazta budapesti helyszínnel, erre ki is jelölte az időpontot, mégpedig 1938-at, Szent István halálának 900. évfordulóját. A hercegprímás alkalmasnak látta a magyar katolicizmust arra, hogy az egész világ előtt szerepeljen egy ilyen rendezvény keretei között.

• 
  Őrségváltás a Királyi Palotában
• 
  Körmenet a Szent István-bazilika bejáratánál
• 
  A Szent Jobb az ereklyetartóban

2020

Predloga:Fő Predloga:Jövő A 2016. január 24. és 31. között a Fülöp-szigeteki Cebuban megtartott 51. Eucharisztikus világkongresszus végén jelentette be Ferenc pápa, hogy a következő kongresszus helyszíne Budapest lesz.

Az 52. Nemzetközi Eucharisztikus Kongresszust (52. Eucharisztikus világkongresszus; rövidítve NEK, IEC2020) eredetileg 2020. szeptember 13–20. között |alma_mater = |occupation = scholar-official (Minister of Rites and Grand Secretary), agronomist, astronomer, mathematician, writer |years_active = |known_for = Three Pillars of Chinese Catholicism
Chinese translation of Euclid's Elements
Chongzhen calendar
Complete Treatise on Agriculture |spouse = Wu |partner = |children = Xu Ji (徐驥) |parents = Xu Sicheng (徐思誠), father |website = |signature = |footnotes = |relations = Candida Xu (granddaughter) (Xu Zhun) (Xu Maheux) }}

Stebunik/peskovnik2
Tradicionalno kitajsko	徐光啓
Poenostavljeno kitajsko	徐光启
Transkripcije standardna mandarinščina Hanju pinjin Xú Guāngqǐ Wade–Giles Hsü2 Kuang1-ch‘i3 IPA [ɕy̌ kwáŋtɕʰì]
Courtesy name
Kitajsko	子先
Transkripcije standardna mandarinščina Hanju pinjin Zǐxiān Wade–Giles Tzu-hsien
2. alternativna kitajska imena
Kitajsko	玄扈
Transkripcije standardna mandarinščina Hanju pinjin Xuánhù Wade–Giles Hsüan-hu
3. alternativna kitajska imane
Tradicionalno kitajsko	保祿
Poenostavljeno kitajsko	保禄
Dobesedni pomen	Paulus
Transkripcije standardna mandarinščina Hanju pinjin Bǎolù Wade–Giles Pao-lu

Servant of God Xu Guangqi
Xu Guangqi with Matteo Ricci (left) From Athanasius Kircher's China Illustrata, 1667
Scholar-bureaucrat, Apologist, Lay leader, First among the Three Pillars of Chinese Catholicism
Rojstvo	April 24, 1562 Shanghai, Ming dynasty China
Smrt	November 8, 1633 Beijing, Ming dynasty China
Čaščenje	Catholic Church
Romarsko središče	Xujiahui Cathedral
Atributi	Ming Empire court dress holding a crucifix and book.

Kangši cesar (peskovnik)

Cesar Kangši je bil tretji cesar iz vladarske hiše Čing

Cesar Kangši (Kangxi) 康熙帝
Cesar iz rodovine Čing
Vladanje	5. februar 1661 – 20. december 1722
Predhodnik	Shunzhi Emperor (izg. Šun-dži)
Naslednik	Yongzheng (izg. Jong-dženg)
Regents	Sonin (1661–1667) Ebilun (1661–1667) Suksaha (1661–1667) Oboi (1661–1669)
Rojstvo	(1654-02-05)5. februar 1654 (順治十一年 三月 十八日) Palača Jingren, Prepovedano mesto
Smrt	20. december 1722 (1722-12-20) (68 let) (康熙六十一年 十一月 十三日) Qingxi Shuwu, Vrt večne pomladi
Pokop	Mavzolej Jing, Vzhodni Čingovi grobovi
žena	gospodična Heseri, cesarica Xiao Cheng Ren ​ ​ (por. 1665; s. 1674)​ cesarica gospodična Niohuru, cesarica Xiao Zhao Ren ​ ​ (por. 1665; s. 1678)​ cesarica gospodična Tunggiya, cesaroca Xiao Yi Ren ​ ​ (s. 1689)​ cesarica gospodična Uya, cesarica Xiao Gong Ren ​ ​ (pred 1722)​
Potomci	Yunzhi Yunreng, Prince Limi of the First Rank Yunzhi, Prince Chengyin of the Second Rank Yongzheng Emperor Yunqi, Prince Hengwen of the First Rank Yunyou, Prince Chundu of the First Rank Yunsi Yuntang Yun'e Yuntao, Prince Lüyi of the First Rank Yinxiang, Prince Yixian of the First Rank Yunti, Prince Xunqin of the Second Rank Yunxu, Prince Yuke of the Second Rank Yunlu, Prince Zhuangke of the First Rank Yunli, Prince Guoyi of the First Rank Yunyi Yunxi, Prince Shenjing of the Second Rank Yunhu Yunqi Yunbi, Prince Xianke of the First Rank Princess Rongxian of the First Rank Princess Duanjing of the Second Rank Princess Kejing of the First Rank Princess Wenxian of the First Rank Princess Chunque of the First Rank Princess Wenke of the Second Rank Princess Quejing of the Second Rank Princess Dunke of the Second Rank
Imena Aisin Gioro Xuanye (愛新覺羅 玄燁) Manchu: Hiowan yei (ᡥᡳᠣᠸᠠᠨ ᠶᡝᡳ) Era dates Kangxi (康熙; 18. februar 1662 – 4. februar 1723) Manchu: Elhe taifin (ᡝᠯᡥᡝ ᡨᠠᡳᡶᡳᠨ) Mongolian: Энх амгалан (ᠡᠩᠬᠡ ᠠᠮᠤᠭᠤᠯᠠᠩ) Posmrtno ime Cesar Hetian Hongyun Wenwu Ruizhe Gongjian Kuanyu Xiaojing Chengxin Zhonghe Gongde Dacheng Ren (合天弘運文武睿哲恭儉寬裕孝敬誠信中和功德大成仁皇帝) Manchu: Gosin hūwangdi (ᡤᠣᠰᡳᠨ ᡥᡡᠸᠠᠩᡩᡳ) Tempeljsko ime Shengzu (聖祖) Manchu: Šengdzu (ᡧᡝᠩᡯᡠ)
Rodbina	Aisin Gioro
Oče	cesar Shunzhi
Mati	cesarica Xiaokangzhang

Stebunik/peskovnik2
Kitajsko ime
Kitajsko	康熙帝
Dobesedni pomen	Cesar obdobja zdravja in slave
Transkripcije standardna mandarinščina Hanju pinjin Kāngxīdì Gvojeu Romatdzjh Kangshi Dih Wade–Giles Kʻang-hsi Ti IPA [kʰáŋɕí tî] Jue: kantonščina Yalska romanizacija Hōng-hēi Dai Džjutping Hong1-hei1 Dai3 Min Nan Tâi-lô Khong-hi Tè
Mongolsko ime
Mongolščina	ᠡᠩᠭᠡ ᠠᠮᠤᠭᠤᠯᠠᠩ ᠬᠠᠭᠠᠨ Энх амгалан хаан
Transkripcije SASM/GNC Engke Amuɣulang Khaan
Mandžursko ime
Mandžurska pisava	ᡝᠯᡥᡝ ᡨᠠᡳᡶᡳᠨ ᡥᡡᠸᠠᠩᡩᡳ
Möllendorff	Elhe Taifin Hūwangdi

Cesar Kangši (=Kangxi) 5. februar 1661 – 20. december 1722, kitajsko osebno ime: Xuanye, je bil tretji cesar iz vladarske hiše Čing, in drugi cesar Čing, ki je vladal nad celotno Kitajsko.

The Kangxi emperor (5 February 1654 – 20 December 1722), personal name Xuanye, was the third Emperor of the Qing dynasty, and the second Qing emperor to rule over China proper.

The Kangxi emperor's reign of 61 years (from 1661 until 1722) makes him the longest-reigning emperor in Chinese history (although his grandson, the Qianlong Emperor, had the longest period of de facto power) and one of the longest-reigning rulers in the world. However, since he ascended the throne at the age of seven, actual power was held for six years by four regents and his grandmother, the Grand Empress Dowager Xiaozhuang.

The Kangxi Emperor is considered one of China's greatest emperors. He suppressed the Revolt of the Three Feudatories, forced the Kingdom of Tungning in Taiwan and assorted Mongol rebels in the North and Northwest to submit to Qing rule, and blocked Tsarist Russia on the Amur River, retaining Outer Manchuria and Outer Northwest China.

Vladavina cesarja Kangšija je prinesla dolgo obdobje trdnosti in napredka v primeri z leti vojn in zmed. On je začetnik obdobja, ki je znano kot "Napredno obdobje Kangšija in Čjanlonga" ali "Visoki Čing", ter je trajalo skozi nekaj rodov po njegovi smrti. Njegov dvor je zbral veliko storitev in zbirk, med katerimi je najbolj znan Kagšijev besednjak .

The Kangxi Emperor's reign brought about long-term stability and relative wealth after years of war and chaos. He initiated the period known as the "Prosperous Era of Kangxi and Qianlong" or "High Qing", which lasted for several generations after his death. His court also accomplished such literary feats as the compilation of the Kangxi Dictionary.

Rojen je 5. februarja 1654, oče Shunzhi in mati Xiaokangzhang v palači Jingren v Prepovedano mesto Born on 5 February 1654 to the Shunzhi Emperor and Empress Xiaokangzhang in Jingren Palace, the Forbidden City, Beijing, the Kangxi Emperor was originally given the personal name Xuanye (kitajsko: 玄燁; pinjin: Xuanye; Manchu transliteration: hiowan yei). He was enthroned at the age of seven (or eight by East Asian age reckoning), on 7 February 1661. However, his era name "Kangxi", only started to be used on 18 February 1662, the first day of the following lunar year.

Življenjepis

Odnos do krščanstva

Jezuitski astronomi – udeleženci Kitajskih misijonov, skupaj s cesarjem Kangšijem (Beauvais, 1690–1705)

V prvih desetletij vladanja cesarja Kangšija je na cesarskem dvoru igrala pomembno vlogo Družba Jezusova. S svojim poznavanjem astronomije so prevzeli vodstvo cesarske zvezdarene. Gerbillon in Pereira sta rabila za tolmača pri razpravah o Nerčinskem sprorazumu. Cesar Kangši je bil hvaležen jezuitom za njihove prispevke ; kot poznavalci mnogih jezikov so bili koristni prevajalci in tolmači ; poznavanje vojaške veščine in njihove iznajdbe so prispevale k napredku njegove vojne industrije in topništva, kar je usposobilo Čingovo cesarstvo za osvojitev Tungninškega cesarstva.

Cesarju Kangšiju je izredno ugajal tudi spoštljiv in nevsiljiv način jezuitov; dobro so govorili kitajšččino in nosili svilene halje vodilnega razreda. Leta 1692, ko je Pereira zaprosil za strpnost do krščanstva, je bil cesar Kangxi pripravljen ustreči in je izdal Odlok o strpnosti tj. Tolerančni edikt, ki je priznal katoličanstvo, prepovedal napade na njihove cerkve, ter uzakonil njihovo poslanstvo in udejanjanje krščanstva pri Kitajskem ljudstvu.

Cesar Kangši je na svojem dvoru držal tudi slikarja Castiglioneja in več jezuitov kot znanstvenike in umetnike.

Do konca sedemnajstega stoletja so jezuitje spreobrnili veliko domačinov. Po drugi strani pa so bili navdušeni nad znanjem in bistroumnostjo konfucijanske učenjaške elite večinskih Kitajcev in so se prilagodili njihovemu starodavnemu miselnemu in življenjskemu slogu.

Leta 1692 je torej cesar Kangši izdal tolerančni edikt glede svobodnega izpovedovanja krščanstva (kitajsko: 容敎令 ali kitajsko: 正敎奉傳).

Evropejci so zelo miroljubni; v deželah ne vznemirjajo in ne motijo, nikomur ne škodijo, ne delajo nobenih hudodelstev in njihovo učenje nima nič skupnega z lažnimi ločinami v cesarstvu, niti se ne nagibajo k spodbujanju upora... Odločili smo torej, da je treba ohraniti vse cerkve, posvečene nebeškemu Gospodarju, ne glede na to, kje se nahajajo, in omogočiti vsem, ki želijo častiti tega Boga, vstop v te cerkve, darovanje kadila in opravljanje obredov, ki jih po starodavnih navadah izvajajo kristjani. Zato naj jim odslej nihče več ne nasprotuje.

Kitajski obredni spor

Izbruhnil pa je nesrečen obredni spor, ali smejo kitajski kristjani sodelovati pri tradicionalnih konfucijevskih slovesnostih in pri obredih v zvezi s spoštovanje prednikov. Jezuitje so se zavzemali za strpnost, a dominikanci so se postavili na trdo stališče zoper tuje "malikovanje". Papež Klemen XI. je pritrdil dominikanskemu stališču in 1705 poslal Tournona kot nuncija k cesarju Kangšiju, da bi izrekel izobčenje nad kitajskimi obredi. Prek Tournona je papež hotel nadzorovati jezuitske misijonarje na Kitajskem, ali res postopajo po njegovih ukazih. Kangši je zavrnil, ker je želel misijonarske dejavnosti na Kitajskem obdržati pod svojim vrhovnim nadzorom, ki ga je predstavljal eden od jezuitov, ki je že dolga leta živel v Pekingu.

Ne ozirajoč se na drugačne poteze nekaterih svojih prednikov, je 19. marca 1715 Klemen XI. objavil bulo Ex illa die, ki je uradno obsodila kitajske obrede. Kot odgovor pa je cesar Kangši uradno prepovedal krščanske misijone na Kitajskem, češ da “povzročajo nemire”.

Odnos do krščanstva

Jezuitski astronomi – udeleženci Kitajskih misijonov, skupaj s cesarjem Kangšijem (Beauvais, 1690–1705)

V prvih desetletij vladanja cesarja Kangšija je na cesarskem dvoru igrala pomembno vlogo Družba Jezusova. S svojim poznavanjem astronomije so prevzeli vodstvo cesarske zvezdarne. Gerbillon in Pereira sta rabila za tolmača pri razpravah o Nerčinskem sprorazumu. Cesar Kangši je bil hvaležen jezuitom za njihove prispevke ; kot poznavalci mnogih jezikov so bili koristni prevajalci in tolmači ; poznavanje vojaške veščine in njihove iznajdbe so prispevale k napredku njegove vojne industrije in topništva, kar je usposobilo Čingovo cesarstvo za osvojitev Tungninškega cesarstva.

Cesarju Kangšiju je izredno ugajal tudi spoštljiv in nevsiljiv način jezuitov; dobro so govorili kitajšččino in nosili svilene halje vodilnega razreda. Leta 1692, ko je Pereira zaprosil za strpnost do krščanstva, je bil cesar Kangxi pripravljen ustreči in je izdal Odlok o strpnosti tj. Tolerančni edikt, ki je priznal katoličanstvo, prepovedal napade na njihove cerkve, ter uzakonil njihovo poslanstvo in udejanjanje krščanstva pri Kitajskem ljudstvu.

Cesar Kangši je na svojem dvoru držal tudi slikarja Castiglioneja in več jezuitov kot znanstvenike in umetnike.

Do konca sedemnajstega stoletja so jezuitje spreobrnili veliko domačinov. Po drugi strani pa so bili navdušeni nad znanjem in bistroumnostjo konfucijanske učenjaške elite večinskih Kitajcev in so se prilagodili njihovemu starodavnemu miselnemu in življenjskemu slogu.

Leta 1692 je torej cesar Kangši izdal tolerančni edikt glede svobodnega izpovedovanja krščanstva (kitajsko: 容敎令 ali kitajsko: 正敎奉傳).

Evropejci so zelo miroljubni; v deželah ne vznemirjajo in ne motijo, nikomur ne škodijo, ne delajo nobenih hudodelstev in njihovo učenje nima nič skupnega z lažnimi ločinami v cesarstvu, niti se ne nagibajo k spodbujanju upora... Odločili smo torej, da je treba ohraniti vse cerkve, posvečene nebeškemu Gospodarju, ne glede na to, kje se nahajajo, in omogočiti vsem, ki želijo častiti tega Boga, vstop v te cerkve, darovanje kadila in opravljanje obredov, ki jih po starodavnih navadah izvajajo kristjani. Zato naj jim odslej nihče več ne nasprotuje.

Kitajski obredni spor

Izbruhnil pa je nesrečen obredni spor, ali smejo kitajski kristjani sodelovati pri tradicionalnih konfucijevskih slovesnostih in pri obredih v zvezi s spoštovanje prednikov. Jezuitje so se zavzemali za strpnost, a dominikanci so se postavili na trdo stališče zoper tuje "malikovanje". Papež Klemen XI. je pritrdil dominikanskemu stališču in 1705 poslal Tournona kot nuncija k cesarju Kangšiju, da bi izrekel izobčenje nad kitajskimi obredi. Prek Tournona je papež hotel nadzorovati jezuitske misijonarje na Kitajskem, ali res postopajo po njegovih ukazih. Kangši je zavrnil, ker je želel misijonarske dejavnosti na Kitajskem obdržati pod svojim vrhovnim nadzorom, ki ga je predstavljal eden od jezuitov, ki je že dolga leta živel v Pekingu.

Ne ozirajoč se na drugačne poteze nekaterih svojih prednikov, je 19. marca 1715 Klemen XI. objavil bulo Ex illa die, ki je uradno obsodila kitajske obrede. Kot odgovor pa je cesar Kangši uradno prepovedal krščanske misijone na Kitajskem, češ da “povzročajo nemire”.

Modri Mezzabarba

Patriarch of Alexandria and apostolic visitator to China; b. Pavia, c. 1685, d. Lodi, Dec. 7, 1741. Mezzabarba was accredited by Clement X with powers of legate a latere (Sept. 18, 1719); his mission to the Sino-Manchu Empire was to negotiate acceptance of the constitution Ex illa die of March 19, 1715, condemning the Chinese rites. In a series of audiences from Dec. 31, 1720, to March 1, 1721, Hsüan-yeh treated the papal plenipotentiary with marked honors, but angrily spurned the antirites decree and threatened repressive measures if it was enforced. Hoping to ease the grave tension, the legate issued a pastoral instruction (Macau, Nov. 4, 1721) in which he accorded eight qualifying permissions previously authorized by Rome itself in case of need, but which were quashed by Benedict XIV 20 years later (1742). Unsuccessful in his mission, Mezzabarba left China on Dec. 9, 1721, and on July 13, 1725, he was named to the See of Lodi. His confessor during the ill-fated legation, the Servite Sostegno Viani, wrote a diary of events, Giornale della Legazione (Cologne 1740), which was critical of the actions of the Beijing Jesuits in this affair.

Votivkirche

Votivkirche
Zaobljubna cerkev na Dunaju ponoči
Religija
Pripadnost	Katoliška Cerkev
Obred	rimski obred
Cerkveni ali organizacijski status	prvovrstno
Vodstvo	Dr. Joseph Farrugia
Leto posvetitve	1879
Status	dejavna
Lega
Kraj	Dunaj, Avstrija
Zvezna država	Dunaj
Lokacija: Avstrija
Koordinati	48.215278°N 16.358611°E / 48.215278; 16.358611
Arhitektura
Arhitekti	Heinrich von Ferstel
Tip	cerkev
Vrsta arhitekture	neogotika
Zgradil	cesar Franc Jožef
Začetek gradnje	1856
Konec gradnje	1879
Lastnosti
Direction of façade	SEbE
Dolžina	85 m (279 ft)
Širina	55 m (180 ft)
Širina ladje	30 m (98 ft)
Maks. višina	99 m (325 ft)
Spletna stran
www.votivkirche.at

The Votivkirche (angleško Votive Church) is a neo-Gothic style church located on the Ringstraße in Vienna, Austria. Following the attempted assassination of Emperor Franz Joseph in 1853, the Emperor's brother Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian inaugurated a campaign to create a church to thank God for saving the Emperor's life. Funds for construction were solicited from throughout the Empire. The church was dedicated in 1879 on the silver anniversary of Emperor Franz Joseph and his wife Empress Elisabeth.

Barve

Barve
Rdeča • Modra • Zelena
Svetlo modra • Oranžna • Siva

rgbX1 • rgbX2 • rgbX3 • rgbX4

V občilih

Secretum (Monaldi & Sorti)

Secretum

Secretum (Monaldi & Sorti)