Gaza (arabsko قطاع غزة Qiṭāʿ Ġazzah [qɪˈtˤɑːʕ ˈɣazza]) je manjše palestinsko ozemlje pod lastno upravo[4][5][6][7][8][9][10] na vzhodni obali Sredozemskega morja, ki meji na Egipt na jugozahodu in Izrael na vzhodu in severu. Gaza skupaj z Zahodnim bregom tvori Palestinska ozemlja, del načrtovane prihodnje države Palestine. Gazo in Zahodni breg deli izraelsko ozemlje. Obe sta pod upravo Palestinskega avtonomnega sveta,[11] toda od junija 2006 je Gaza pod upravo Hamasa, palestinske islamske organizacije,[12] ki je prevzela oblast po zmagi na volitvah leta 2006. Takrat sta Izrael in ZDA proti Gazi uvedla mednarodni ekonomski in politični bojkot.[13]

Gaza
قطاع غزة
Qiṭāʿ Ġazzah
Zastava Gaza
]][[Palestinska zastava
Lega Gaza
StatusPredloga:Infobox country/status text
Največje mestoGaza
31°31′N 34°27′E / 31.517°N 34.450°E / 31.517; 34.450
Uradni jezikiarabščina
Etnične skupine
Površina
• skupaj
365 km2[2]
Prebivalstvo
• ocena End 2015
1,85 milijona[3]
• gostota
5046/km2
Valuta
Časovni pasUTC +2 (​)
• poletni (DST)
UTC +3
Klicna koda+970
  1. Palestino priznava 137 članic Združenih narodov.
  2. od leta 1951.
  3. od leta 1986 Izrael, nato old Israeli shekel (1980–1985) in Israeli lira (1967–1980).

Ozemlje Gaze je dolgo 41 km in široko 6 do 12 km, s skupno površino 365 km².[14][15] S številom prebivalcev 1,85 milijona Palestincev,[3] sodi med šest najgosteje poseljenih območij na svetu.[16][17] Zaradi velikega izraelskega tamponskega območja je precejšen del Gaze nedostopen za prebivalce.[18] Z naravnim prirastom prebivalstva 2,91 % (ocena leta 2014) je trinajsta na svetu in pogosto označena za prenaseljeno.[15][19] Do leta 2020 naj bo po ocenah prebivalstvo naraslo na 2,1 milijona, kar bi še poslabšalo razmere za prebivalstvo.[20] Zaradi izraelsko-egiptovske blokade prebivalci ne smejo prosto zapustiti Gaze ali vstopiti vanjo, prepovedana sta tudi izvoz in uvoz izdelkov. Večina prebivalstva Gaze predstavljajo Suniti.

Kljub izraelskemu umiku iz Gaze leta 2005[21] Združeni narodi, mednarodne organizacije za človekove pravice ter večina državnikov in pravnikov označuje, da je Gaza še vedno pod izraelsko okupacijo, ki jo podpira tudi Egipt z omejitvami prebivalcev. Izrael tako ohranja neposreden nadzor nad Gazo od zunaj in posredni nadzor nad življenjem v Gazi: nadzira zračni in pomorski prostor Gaze ter šest od sedmih mejnih prehodov Gaze na kopnem. Hkrati si jemlje pravico, da vstopi v Gazo z vojsko in ohranja tamponska območja znotraj ozemlja Gaze, ki je od Izraela odvisna na področnih oskrbe z vodo, elektriko, telekomunikacij in ostalih komunalnih storitev.[21]

Po zmagi Hamasa na volitvah leta 2006 se je Fatah odrekel sodelovanju v koaliciji, dokler ni Saudova Arabija izpogajala vlado narodne enotnosti. Ko je ta pod skupnim pritiskom Izraela in ZDA junija 2007 razpadla, je palestinski svet prevzel upravo Zahodnega brega, Hamas pa upravljanje Gaze.[22] Izrael in Višegrajska skupina sta na to odgovorila z dodatnimi gospodarskimi sankcijami proti Hamasu. V Gazi je med Hamasom in Fatahom izbruhnil kratek spopad za nadzor nad ozemljem, pri čemer so sodelovale ZDA, toda Hamas je ostal na oblasti ter izgnal člane Fataha in PA iz uprave[23][24] ter ostaja na čelu Gaze.[22]

SkliciUredi

  1. Mideast accord: the overview; Rabin and Arafat sign accord ending Israel's 27-year hold on Jericho and the Gaza Strip. Chris Hedges, New York Times, 5 May 1994.
  2. The Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade Arhivirano 2015-07-17 na Wayback Machine.. UN OCHA, July 2015. "1.8 million Palestinians in Gaza are ‘locked in’, denied free access to the remainder of the occupied Palestinian territory and the outside world." Available at Fact Sheets Arhivirano 2016-03-29 na Wayback Machine..
  3. 3,0 3,1 Table 3: Projected Population in the State of Palestine by Governorate, End Year 2015. PCBS, Palestinians at the End of 2015, p. 36. Source:
  4. »WORKING IN THE GAZA STRIP«. UNRWA. Pridobljeno 8. februarja 2016. The Gaza Strip is a coastal strip of land along the Mediterranean Sea, bordering Egypt at the south-west and Israel to the north and east.
  5. James Kraska, 'Rule Selection in the Case of Israel's Blockade of Gaza:Law of Naval Warfare or Law of Sea?,' in M.N. Schmitt, Louise Arimatsu, Tim McCormack (eds.,) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Springer Science & Business Media, 2011 pp.367-395, p.387:'There are no Israeli troops in Gaza, which everybody regards as a self-governing enclave cut from the Middle East.'
  6. »Life in the Gaza Strip«. BBC News. 14. julij 2014. Pridobljeno 8. februarja 2016.
  7. »Gaza: The Basics«. Slate. 25. januar 2008. Pridobljeno 8. februarja 2016.
  8. »What's The Difference Between The West Bank and The Gaza Strip?«. International Business Times. 18. junij 2014. Pridobljeno 8. februarja 2016.
  9. »Environmental Assessment of the Gaza Strip« (PDF). United Nations Environment Programme. 2009. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča (PDF) dne 28. junija 2010. Pridobljeno 8. februarja 2016.
  10. »Everything You Need to Know About the Israel-Gaza Conflict«. ABC News. 31. julij 2014. Pridobljeno 8. februarja 2016.
  11. Joshua Castellino, Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Minority Rights in the Middle East, Oxford University Press 2013 p.150:'Palestinians under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza constitute a majority (demographically) with representation by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), a self-governing body run by Fatah in the West Bank, and by Hamas in the Gaza Strip'.
  12. Tristan Dunning, Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy: Reinterpreting Resistance in Palestine, Routledge, 2016 p.212:'Since taking sole control of Gaza in June 2007, Hamas has proven itself to be a remarkably resilient and resourceful government entity. The movement has clearly entrenched itself as the hegemonic power in the coastal enclave to such an extent that the International Crisis Group contends that the power struggle in Gaza is no longer between Hamas and Fatah. Rather the main source of confrontation is between Hamas and other more hardline Islamists and salafists. . . Hamas has been far more successful in an administrative sense than the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, despite having access to only a fraction of the resources.'
  13. Sara Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector, Princeton University Press, 2013 p.41:'Hamas's democratic victory, however, was short-lived . .followed as it was in June 2006 by an Israeli and U.S.-led international political and economic boycott of the new Palestinian government. The boycott amounted to a form of collective punishment against the entire Palestinian population and, to my knowledge, was the first time in the history of the conflict that the international community imposed sanctions on the occupied rather than the occupier.'
  14. Arnon, Arie (Autumn 2007). »Israeli Policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Economic Dimension, 1967-2007« (PDF). Middle East Journal. 61 (4): 575. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča (PDF) dne 30. junija 2013.
  15. 15,0 15,1 Gaza Strip Arhivirano 2014-06-08 na Wayback Machine. Entry at the CIA World Factbook
  16. Thomas E. Copeland, Drawing a Line in the Sea: The Gaza Flotilla Incident and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Lexington Books, 2011 p.25
  17. Doug Suisman,Steven Simon,Glenn Robinson,C. Ross Anthony,Michael Schoenbaum (eds.) The Arc: A Formal Structure for a Palestinian State, Rand Corporation, 2007 p.79
  18. Hilmi S.Salem, 'Social, Environmental and Security Impacts of Climate Change on the Eastern Mediterranean,' in Hans Günter Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Béchir Chourou, Pál Dunay, Joern Birkmann(eds.), Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security: Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks, Springer Science & Business Media, 2011 pp.421-445 p.431.
  19. The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace - Page 52, Cheryl Rubenberg - 2003
  20. Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people: Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, para 20. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 6 July 2015 (doc.nr. TD/B/62/3). Source.
    para 40: "The study stressed that Gaza’s population would increase from 1.6 million in 2011 to 2.1 million in 2020, and concluded that for Gaza to be a liveable place in 2020 “herculean efforts” needed to be accelerated in such sectors as health, education, energy, water and sanitation (United Nations, 2012). However, instead of such efforts, the tragedy in Gaza has deteriorated and its de-development was accelerated by destruction in 2014." para 43: "The social, health and security-related ramifications of the high population density and overcrowding are among the factors that may render Gaza unliveable by 2020, if present trends continue"
  21. 21,0 21,1 Sanger, Andrew (2011). Schmitt, M.N.; Arimatsu, =Louise; McCormack, Tim (ur.). »The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla«. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2010. Springer Science+Business Media. 13: 429. ISBN 9789067048118.{{navedi časopis}}: Vzdrževanje CS1: dodatno ločilo (povezava)
  22. 22,0 22,1 Dennis J. Deeb II, Israel, Palestine, & the Quest for Middle East Peace, University Press of America, 2013.
  23. David Rose, 'The Gaza Bombshell,' Vanity Fair April,2008.'The plan was for forces led by Dahlan, and armed with new weapons supplied at America’s behest, to give Fatah the muscle it needed to remove the democratically elected Hamas-led government from power. . But the secret plan backfired, resulting in a further setback for American foreign policy under Bush. Instead of driving its enemies out of power, the U.S.-backed Fatah fighters inadvertently provoked Hamas to seize total control of Gaza.'
  24. Sara Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza, p.45.' Dahlan, who was supported by U.S. officials, has been a bitter enemy of Hamas since his 1996 crackdown on the movement. He consistently refused to accept the Palestinian unity government brokered by the Saudi government in the Mecca Agreement "and made his opposition intolerable to Hamas when he refused to subject the security forces under his command, armed and trained by the U.S., to the legitimate Palestinian unity government as agreed between Hamas and Fatah." Alistair Crooke, a former Middle East adviser to the EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, similarly observed, "Dahlan refused to deal with (the independent interior minister appointed to the unity government), and put his troops on the streets in defiance of the interior minister. Hamas felt that they had little option but to take control of security away from forces which were in fact creating insecurity." Hence, Hamas was not attempting a coup against the government or the Fatah organization as a whole but also against Dahlan's U.S.-funded militia (and individual Fatah loyalists it blamed for the murder of Hamas members).'